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Under the Direction of Marilynn Richtarik, PhD 
 
ABSTRACT 
Criticism of James Joyce’s Ulysses has often centered on the novel’s unconventional 
narrative structure. Most critics recognize a consistent style in the first six episodes of the novel, 
but, beginning with the seventh episode, “Aeolus,” the narration changes rapidly and 
dramatically. This proliferation of voices has led many critics to suggest that the novel represents 
a break from the traditional view of literature as imitating nature. To the contrary, I argue that 
Ulysses should be read as a work of representational fiction modeled in large part on the multi-
perspectival nonfiction of Daniel Defoe, especially his extended journalistic work The Storm 
(1704). From his reading of Defoe, Joyce realized that a complex subject is best captured 
through the use of diverse, often contrasting, perspectives, genres, and styles. Consequently, 
while resembling a postmodern work, Ulysses remains in the mimetic tradition, though Joyce’s 
multiperspectival approach pushes this tradition to its limit.  
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Much of the criticism surrounding James Joyce’s Ulysses centers on the novel’s 
unconventional narrative structure. Most critics recognize a consistent style in the first six 
episodes of the novel, but, beginning with the seventh episode, “Aeolus,” the narration changes 
rapidly and dramatically.1 This proliferation of voices has led many critics to suggest that the 
novel represents a break from the traditional view of literature as imitating nature. To the 
contrary, I will argue that Ulysses should be read as a work of representational fiction modeled, 
in large part, on the multi-perspectival nonfiction of Daniel Defoe, especially his extended 
journalistic work The Storm (1704).2 As increasing stylistic shifts indicate, Joyce abandoned the 
notion of a single representative language and, by implication, the idea of omniscient aesthetic 
perspective. All the same, he did not abandon the traditional goal of representation. From his 
reading of Defoe, Joyce realized that a complex subject is best captured through the use of 
diverse, often contrasting, perspectives, genres, and styles. Consequently, despite resembling a 
postmodernist work, Ulysses remains squarely within the mimetic tradition, though Joyce’s 
multi-perspectival approach pushes this tradition to its very limits. 
                                                 
1 Most critics agree that there is greater consistency in the initial episodes, but equally maintain that “the initial style 
is by no means utterly consistent” (Trotter 104). John Somer, for example, describes a shifting “fusion” of narrative 
voices (71), while Michael Groden prefers to speak of “variations on a basic style” (15). David Hayman even claims 
to detect “snatches of the later styles in the early passages” (84). 
2 The Storm chronicles The Great Storm of 1703, a devastating extratropical cyclone that swept through England on 
the 26th of November causing widespread destruction and loss of life. 
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The narrative structure I attribute to Ulysses is best described as a form of perspectivism.3  
Perspectivism maintains that the act of understanding and describing the world is always 
discriminatory. That is, individuals always attend to those aspects of the world that seem 
important to them, while ignoring those that seem unimportant. Thus, human understanding is 
always circumscribed by a particular viewpoint and hence incomplete. Given these limitations, 
no single description, however artfully crafted and comprehensive, can be considered definitive. 
Every individual account leaves out something that might be thought significant by others. 
Because perspective is necessarily limited, no single narrative style, not even the 
carefully blended style of the initial six episodes of Ulysses, could adequately chronicle even the 
most ordinary day in Dublin. Any successful representation of such a complex subject would 
have to incorporate a multitude of Dublin voices, each with its own particular cares, concerns, 
and prejudices of thought and speech. In short, a realistic representation of a diverse and 
contradictory metropolis would have to embody equally diverse and even contradictory narrative 
voices.  
In Ulysses, Joyce uses the notion of astronomical parallax as a metaphor for recognizing 
truth among alternative perspectives. In astronomy, “parallax” describes the difference in 
apparent movement of a celestial body when it is observed from different positions: for example, 
the drift of constellations as viewed throughout the year. The phenomenon of parallax implies 
that every observational vantage point entails distortions, though these distortions can be greatly 
minimized when observations are compared. In fact, it is by carefully comparing parallax that 
astronomers are able to fix the position of stars with relative accuracy. 
                                                 
3 Though he never uses the phrase, “perspectivism” is most often associated with the philosopher Friedrich 
Nietzsche who repeatedly rails against the notion of a perspectiveless perspective. 
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Though this approach to representation is unorthodox, Ulysses is mimetic in so far as it 
strives to imitate the world, and there is clear precedent for this sort of mimesis in nonfiction 
writing.4 One of the best examples is a work well known to Joyce, which he praised for 
verisimilitude: Daniel Defoe’s The Storm (Joyce, Defoe 16). This work, arguably the first 
extended piece of journalism, carefully preserves individual accounts of The Great Storm of 
1703 in order to faithfully record the tempest for posterity. Like Joyce, Defoe saw the 
chronicler’s task as mimetic but maintained that a collection of individual accounts, each in its 
own style, is better able to capture the subject than any account crafted by the author, no matter 
how superior stylistically. 
In my first chapter, I will examine Joyce’s critical writing, especially the 1903-1904 
notebooks in which he sketches his general approach to aesthetics. Because his theory was never 
fully developed, I supplement these remarks with an examination of relevant passages in his 
early fiction as well as in the writings of those who principally influenced his thinking, Aristotle 
and Thomas Aquinas. My aim in the first chapter is to show that, broadly speaking, Joyce 
maintained a representational view of aesthetics, though this position raises questions about the 
proliferation of voices in Ulysses, which seems incompatible with such a position. 
In the second chapter, I analyze references to astronomical parallax in Ulysses as the key 
to understanding how a mimetic view of art can be seen as compatible with the narrative 
structure of Ulysses. I contextualize these references with passages from their source, Robert 
Stawell Ball’s popular scientific treatise The Story of the Heavens (1885). This chapter 
                                                 
4 Throughout this thesis, I use the word “mimesis” in its most basic sense to mean imitating or copying from nature, 
leaving open questions about which aspects of nature—appearances, for example, or some underlying reality—
should be imitated or copied. 
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demonstrates that parallax serves as a metaphorical model for rethinking aesthetic representation 
altogether and that this model offers a way of understanding the diverse voices that predominate 
in the later sections of Ulysses as alternative perspectives required to establish truth. 
In my third chapter, I will discuss Daniel Defoe’s pioneering journalistic work The 
Storm, with special focus on the lengthy preface in which he defends his atypical methodology. I 
will also describe the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the work’s composition, as well 
as Joyce’s critical appraisal of its success. I argue that The Storm serves as an unrecognized 
precedent for the perspectival representation found in Ulysses. Thus, critical assertions that the 
novel is intended to demonstrate the success of one representational style or the failure of all 
such styles are without warrant. 
My argument that Ulysses should be read as a work of representational fiction based in 
part upon Defoe’s nonfiction runs counter to prevailing critical approaches, which view the novel 
as a radical break from the mimetic tradition. In Book as World, one of the first extended 
discussions of style in Ulysses, Marilyn French describes Joyce as a “malicious ringmaster” who 
“highhandedly” rearranges “recognizable” language in such a way that it literally makes “no 
sense.” His intention, she suggests, is to demonstrate the inescapable “arbitrariness” of all 
language and thus thrust before the reader the “void” which lies at the “core” of all signification 
(128). Following in a similar vein, later critics, such as Karen Lawrence, have maintained that 
Joyce increasingly came to doubt language’s ability to “capture reality” and that the stylistic 
“parody” evident in the latter sections of Ulysses is intended to “undermine the notion of style as 
an absolute manner of seeing things” (33). 
Though my primary aim is to argue that Ulysses should be read as a work of 
representational fiction inspired by Defoe, I will briefly suggest how this approach has 
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advantages over prevailing views. First, the novel may be seen as continuous with Joyce’s earlier 
criticism and fiction. As expected, given the view of art expressed in the 1903/4 notebooks, 
Joyce’s intentions in Ulysses are mimetic, although, as in his earlier novel A Portrait of the Artist 
as a Young Man, he strives for verisimilitude by increasingly incorporating multiple voices. This 
transition to a perspectival form of mimesis also highlights the impact of historical events, 
including the rise of mass marketing and nationalist propaganda that exploited more traditional 
forms of representation. Writing at the close of the First World War, Joyce appears determined 
not to perpetuate the tradition of totalizing narratives that had helped to give birth to many 
modern horrors. Finally, a perspectival reading of Ulysses suggests a way of relating the novel’s 
unusual narrative structure to its story. Like the novel before it, Ulysses chronicles the artist’s 
maturation and is, to an extent, autobiographical. As the novel unfolds, there is a transition in 
both narrative structure and action from the monocular perspective of the aspiring writer, 
Stephen, to the binocular vision of Bloom, who, as Timothy Brennan suggests, serves as Joyce’s 
“aesthetic spokesman” in Ulysses (147). In this transition, the reader comes to realize that 
Bloom’s perspectival empathy is exactly what is needed both to create art and to escape the 




Man is differentiated from other animals because he is the most imitative, he learns his first 
lessons through imitation, and we observe that all men take pleasure in imitation. 
--Aristotle, Poetics (Preface) 
Joyce’s Mirror 
Perhaps the oldest and most enduring theory of aesthetics asserts that works of art express 
truth by imitating some aspect of the world. Erich Auerbach persuasively argues that, though 
commitment to the truth wavers, the attempt to hold up a mirror to the world can be traced from 
the earliest Biblical literature to the work of twentieth-century novelists such as Marcel Proust, 
Knut Hamsun, and Virginia Woolf. Because of their explicit rejection of conventional narrative 
styles, however, many of these writers have been incorrectly interpreted as standing in 
opposition to mimesis. James Joyce, in particular, is thought of as being hostile to the mimetic 
tradition because of the increasingly iconoclastic style of his later novels.  
Despite this break with tradition, Joyce’s only systematic statement of aesthetics is, 
nevertheless, surprisingly conservative in nature. In short, he argues that beauty derives from the 
appreciation of natural forms that have been skillfully recreated by an artist. Though the details 
of such apprehension remain obscure, there can be no doubt that, at least for the young Joyce, 
mirroring lies at the heart of the aesthetic enterprise. In light of his later, more experimental 
novels, Joyce’s early defense of mimesis appears puzzling, almost unbelievable. Assuming that 
his fiction is to some extent influenced by his theory of art, there appear to be two alternatives. 
As many suppose, Joyce might have gradually rejected the tradition he defended in his youth.5 
                                                 
5 By far the majority of contemporary critics fall into this category. Prominent examples include Brook Thomas, 
who writes of language’s failure to “refer to a world beyond itself” (3); John Paul Riquelme, who speaks of 
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Alternately, the sort of mimetic theory Joyce sketched as a young man may be much more 
sophisticated than has been supposed. In fact, it may counterintuitively suggest that certain truths 
can be expressed only by a carefully distorted image of the world. 
Beauty as Apprehension 
In a 1903 letter to his mother, Joyce wrote that he planned to complete a fully developed 
aesthetic theory by the time he turned thirty (Letters II, 38). At the time, he was only twenty-one. 
Though Joyce had already written criticism, he had not yet written anything that could be 
considered systematic aesthetics. His thoughts on the subject seem to have derived principally 
from the writing of two philosophers, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, which he had studied in the 
course of his Catholic education. Combining their thoughts with his own, however, presented a 
difficult, perhaps overly ambitious, challenge for the young Joyce.  
Joyce first began to gather his thoughts on aesthetics in a notebook during his second stay 
in Paris.6 The notebook, transcribed by H. S. Gorman while researching his 1949 biography of 
Joyce, consists of a series of connected observations about aesthetics followed by the author’s 
name and date. The final entry consists of a sequence of questions and answers reminiscent of 
the catechistic style of Aquinas’s Summa Theologica. The early entries are mainly concerned 
with distinctions among literary genres, while the latter are primarily concerned with the nature 
of art. Less than a year later, Joyce returned to aesthetics in a second, more systematic series of 
observations written while he was teaching in Pola, Austria. Unlike the Paris reflections, which 
                                                 
writing’s inability to “stand for the unwritten” and “nonverbal” (xv); and Wolfgang Iser, who states simply that 
Ulysses “puts an end to representation” (10). 
6  The 1903/1904 notebooks are published as “Aesthetics” in Mason and Ellmann's collection The Critical Writings 
of James Joyce, 141-48.  
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seem to borrow heavily from Aristotle’s Poetics, the Pola entries almost invariably begin with 
quotations from Aquinas, which are then explicated in some detail. Though these quotations are 
clearly taken from Aquinas, no specific citations are noted, and there is considerable 
disagreement about Joyce’s sources.7 Though certain phrases appear throughout Aquinas’s 
writing, most of Joyce’s quotations appear to be taken from the Summa Theologica. 
Joyce introduces the more systematic theory sketched in the Pola notebook with 
Aquinas’s assertion that goods are things toward which the appetites tend, followed by 
Aristotle’s similar claim that goods are things considered desirable (“Aesthetics” 146). As Fran 
O’Rourke points out, the first quotation appears to come from Aquinas’s Summa Theologica, 
question sixteen, article one, while the second is taken from the opening of Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics and frequently paraphrased in the Summa Theologica (99, 100). Assuming 
that appetites and desires are considered to be roughly synonymous, the second definition does 
little to supplement the first.  
After defining a good generally as the object of desire, Joyce then defines an aesthetic 
good specifically as the object of a distinct aesthetic desire, which is spiritual and hence constant 
in nature. Moreover, he adds, this desire aims at grasping relations between diverse sensations. 
Joyce refers to the process of perceiving sensible order as “apprehension,” and this process, he 
asserts, is intrinsically satisfying (147). That is, we find pleasure in discovering connections 
                                                 
7 Given that Joyce was clearly familiar with Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles, many critics, such as Ellsworth 
Mason and Richard Ellmann (Critical Writings 146) and Jacques Aubert (101), assert that the opening epigraph is 
taken from the third chapter of this work. Fran O’Rourke, in contrast, argues persuasively that the passage was 
introduced to Joyce conversationally by his professor of Italian at University College Dublin, Father Artifoni, and is 




between sensations, and this pleasure is presumably the satisfaction we feel when we appreciate 
beauty. 
Joyce writes that apprehension is made up of two distinct activities, which he describes as 
“cognition or simple perception” and “recognition.” Joyce adds that both activities are pleasant 
and hence anything subject to them, even an object commonly considered hideous, is somewhat 
pleasant and thus beautiful (147). Though anything subject to apprehension is pleasant and thus 
beautiful, Joyce notes that we conventionally refer to objects that give the greatest amount of 
satisfaction as “beautiful” and those that give the least as “ugly” (148). While Joyce offers no 
examples, it seems reasonably clear that he assumes conventional assessments of beauty to be 
roughly accurate. Thus, for instance, the apprehension of a masterwork is more pleasant than a 
child’s drawing, and hence the masterwork is more beautiful. The reader is, however, left 
wondering what makes the apprehension of certain objects more satisfying than others. 
Presumably, grasping the sensible relations in a masterpiece offers more satisfaction than 
understanding those in a simple drawing. Though this much seems plain, it is not clear why the 
sensations related in a masterwork give so much more pleasure than those in a drawing. Is it a 
matter of the quality of relations or their quantity, or some combination of the two? Perhaps the 
simple relations of a drawing do not satisfy as much as the complex relations of a painting. 
Perhaps there are simply fewer relations overall in a drawing than in a painting and hence less 
pleasure in their apprehension. 
Such questions may at first appear unimportant given that everyone recognizes a 
masterwork to be aesthetically superior to a simple drawing, but they become crucial when 
comparing works of approximately equal status. Judging between a masterpiece and a rough 
drawing seems straightforward, but how are we to judge between the works of two masters? 
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Joyce suggests that our conventional assessments are largely correct, but what happens when 
there is a real disagreement? Here, it seems, we must better understand what makes the 
perception of sensible relations more or less satisfying. Joyce, unfortunately, says little about 
what makes apprehension intrinsically pleasing, and, more problematically, he fails to describe 
clearly the individual stages of apprehension or, more broadly, apprehension itself. The 
scholastic terminology Joyce employs is far from self-explanatory, and the absence of 
explication makes it difficult to articulate, much less evaluate, his theory. The term 
“apprehension” is, nevertheless, found in the Summa Theologica and, given that this is most 
likely Joyce’s source, it helps to examine in some detail how the term is ordinarily understood by 
Aquinas. 
Aquinas on Apprehension 
Aquinas frequently uses the Latin term apprehensio, translated as “apprehension,” to 
describe perception, the process by which we understand sensory experience.8 The term, which 
literally means “to seize,” suggests that for Aquinas the act of interpreting sense experience is 
similar to physical grasping. When persons perceive something, they metaphorically seize it with 
the mind. The implication is that when we distinguish objects we forcefully take possession of 
them. But how, one is left asking, do we forcefully take hold of the world around us with the 
mind? 
Aquinas, like Aristotle, took a middle path between empiricists, who believe that 
knowledge derives entirely from the senses, and rationalists, who maintain that knowledge 
                                                 
8 Though the term apprehensio can be found throughout Aquinas’s writing, it is interesting to note that he uses the 
term to describe the perception of both actual and imaginary objects. See, for example, Disputed Questions on Truth, 
Q. I, Art. 11. 
11 
 
comes wholly from the mind. For Aquinas, our knowledge of the world requires both the senses 
and intellect, body and mind. Our understanding of the world, he argues, begins with sensations, 
but the mind, referred to by Aquinas as the “agent intellect,” abstracts from these sensations a 
substantial form or quidditas. In short, the senses provide material that the agent intellect 
recognizes as having an essence or quidditas.9 Perception thus involves not just sensing an object 
but grasping its nature. Most often, presumably, this process is almost instantaneous. That is, we 
perceive something immediately as some particular thing: a house, tree, or dog, for example. Of 
course, our initial perception may turn out to be mistaken. I may, for instance, mistake a stranger 
for a friend. In most cases, however, we experience the world around us as broken down into 
familiar objects. When we recognize these things and know how to interact with them, we, in a 
sense, grasp or “seize” them cognitively. 
For Aquinas, seizing something intellectually in this manner does not yet involve a 
judgment that could be considered true or false. I may, for example, perceive a close friend, but 
until I have made a statement about my perception (for example, “So-and-so is standing in front 
of me”) there is, strictly speaking, no assertion that could be assigned a truth value. Once I make 
an assertion about my perception, however, this perceptual judgment can be assessed as true or 
false. Thus, apprehension alone, or “simple perception,” unlike a judgment about apprehension, 
has no truth value.10 
                                                 
9 For a concise description of Aquinas’s “middle path” as well as the function of the agent intellect, see Summa 
Theologica I, Q. 84, Art. 6, 392-95. 
10 Aquinas makes this point in many places. See, for instance, Summa Theologica I, Q. 16, Art. 2, 171-72. 
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Joyce’s description of the initial phase of apprehension as “simple” perception initially 
suggests that he means something like an unarticulated perception.11 His description of the 
second phase as “recognition,” however, implies the pairing of sensations and ideas. The initial 
phase, cognition, thus seems to refer to a preliminary sensory stage despite the fact that the term 
“cognition” implies a sort of knowledge. Perhaps sensation involves a basic knowledge required 
for recognition. 
Associating apprehension with apprehensio in this way suggests why the perception of 
some objects may be more satisfying than others. The Latin term quidditas means literally the 
“whatness” of a thing—that is, the fundamental feature or set of features that make a thing the 
sort of thing it is rather than something else. In short, it is a defining characteristic or set of 
characteristics. The term is traditionally understood in contrast to the term “accident,” which 
refers to the inessential characteristics of things. Thus an object could alter its accidental 
qualities and remain the same thing, but if it were to alter its quidditas it would become 
something else.12 
Though we mostly perceive the world around us immediately and unproblematically, this 
is not always the case, especially when it comes to complex human actions, which are often open 
to varying interpretations. Are a certain person’s actions moral? Quite frequently there is no clear 
answer and equally compelling arguments can be made on either side. In these complicated 
                                                 
11 The scholastic phrase “simple perception” is traditionally used to refer to a perception that has not yet been 
articulated and, hence, has no truth value. See, for example, Charles Coppens’s A Brief Text-Book of Logic and 
Mental Philosophy, Ch. 1, Art. 1. 
12 For an overview of quidditas and roughly synonymous terms like “essence” and “form,” see Aquinas’s On Being 
and Essence, Ch. 1. 
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situations we might say that the particular circumstances (or, to use Aquinas’s terminology, 
incidental “accidents”) make it difficult to perceive clearly the exact moral nature of the action.  
Building upon the ideas expressed in the Pola notebook, it seems reasonable to suppose 
that, just as perception of the world around us gives satisfaction, our inability to perceive the 
world conversely evokes frustration. Such frustration is, however, at times alleviated by more 
perceptive individuals who are able deftly to separate incidental from essential features, thus 
enabling us to see clearly the true nature of the world around us. Perhaps great artists play a 
similar role for us by creating works of art that strip away distracting incidental material so that 
we have the satisfaction of grasping complex universal truths often concealed by accidental 
features. Perhaps the revelation of such complex truths is not only uniquely difficult, but also 
joyous. If so, the most satisfying art would be that which offers exceptionally profound and far-
reaching insight.  
Such a position bears a striking similarity to that of Aquinas’s philosophical mentor, 
Aristotle, who counsels aspiring poets to tackle the most difficult subject, complex human action, 
and to structure their depictions carefully so that they clearly reveal the true nature of the action 
portrayed.13 Aristotle even goes so far as to offer practical advice, primarily about plot 
structuring, intended to help poets minimize incidental features so that the true nature of the 
action depicted, its quidditas, can be plainly revealed to the audience in a powerful cathartic 
moment.14 
                                                 
13 Aristotle writes that, though there are many imitative arts, poetry focuses upon the imitation of human “actions” 
and tragedy, in particular, examines a “noble and complete action, having the proper magnitude” (Poetics 61, 63). 
14 The “soul of tragedy,” according to Aristotle, is the plot, and the bulk of his discussion is focused on the 
successful “arrangement of incidents” (64-69). The “goal” of this arrangement, he writes, is to make clear the 
14 
 
Stephens’s Aesthetic Theory 
Though the aesthetic theory sketched in the Pola notebook, when interpreted in the light 
of Aquinas’s apprehensio, suggests a consistent and perhaps persuasive system, Joyce 
complicates matters in the final notebook entry, which gives the appearance of having been 
almost an afterthought. Entitled simply “The Act of Apprehension,” the entry begins by 
acknowledging that, while apprehension was described as consisting of two intrinsically 
satisfying phases, “apprehension,” in its “most complete” instance, “involves” a third hitherto 
unmentioned phase described simply as the “activity of satisfaction” (148). Moreover, the 
satisfaction associated with this third phase, rather than that associated with the first two phases, 
as he had earlier claimed, “chiefly” accounts for the use of aesthetic terms such as “beautiful” 
and “ugly” (148). 
The addition of this third phase of apprehension is problematic for a number of reasons. 
First, Joyce had described satisfaction as a quality of cognition, recognition, and, consequently, 
apprehension as a whole. In the final entry, the term “satisfaction” is used to refer not simply to 
the quality of an action but, oddly, a distinct activity in itself. Though it seems perfectly natural 
to speak of an activity as more or less satisfying, it is difficult to make sense of satisfaction as an 
activity in its own right. Furthermore, even if it were possible to conceive of satisfaction as a 
distinct activity, this notion raises paradoxical questions such as whether the activity of 
satisfaction could ever be unsatisfying. At first glance, Joyce’s final entry does little to clarify his 
theory. In fact, it throws his aesthetics into greater confusion, if not contradiction. To make any 
                                                 
“universal.” That is, “what sort of man turns out to say or do what sort of thing according to probability or 
necessity” (Poetics 65). 
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sense of Joyce’s theory of art the three phases of apprehension need to be more clearly 
articulated, as does the relation of these phases to overall aesthetic satisfaction. 
Though Joyce does not develop his aesthetics further in the Pola notebook, he describes a 
strikingly similar theory twelve years later in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. Towards 
the close of the novel, Stephen presents his developing ideas about aesthetics to a fellow 
university student, Lynch (179-89). This theory, which Stephen humorously refers to as “applied 
Aquinas,” not only closely parallels the one articulated earlier but also takes phrasing verbatim 
from the notebooks (184). One important addition, however, comes as Stephen describes the 
three phases of apprehension, which are now referred to with Latin terms: integritas (translated 
by Stephen as “wholeness”), consonantia or “harmony,” and claritas or “radiance” (186). 
Though Joyce nowhere indicates that Stephen’s aesthetic theory is primarily based upon his own 
ideas, given the unmistakable similarities it is almost impossible not to associate the three phases 
Stephen describes with those more briefly sketched in the Pola notebook. Moreover, the 
additional clarification that Stephen offers helps to resolve the problems raised by Joyce’s 
theory.  
Stephen begins with integritas or wholeness, in which the apprehended object is 
separated from its background. Stephen describes the activity of distinguishing an object from its 
context as drawing a “bounding line” around the object in order to demarcate it from everything 
else (186). Sounds, he adds, are chiefly separated from a temporal background while images are 
separated from a spatial background. As a result of integritas, the object comes to be seen as a 
separate entity or, as Stephen expresses it, “one thing,” and the intellect advances to an analysis 
of its features (187). 
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The second phase, consonantia or harmony, involves analyzing the structure of an object 
that has been distinguished from its surroundings. Stephen depicts the process of analyzing an 
object as being “led by its formal lines” from “point to point” so that the way in which the parts 
relate to the whole becomes clear. In this process, an object, seen as irregular, discordant, and 
diverse, gradually comes to be understood as rhythmic, “harmonious,” and whole (187). When 
the object is recognized as an integrated unity, the intellect then associates the object analyzed 
with the concept of some familiar thing. 
The final phase of apprehension, claritas or radiance, Stephen confesses, gave him the 
most difficulty because of Aquinas’s “vague” language. After trying to conceive claritas as a 
sort of “symbolism or idealism,” Stephen states that he came to understand it as indicating what 
the scholastics referred to as the “quidditas, the whatness of a thing” (187). Once an object has 
been singled out from its environment and understood as a unified whole, the mind connects it 
with the nature or essence that defines it. When associated with a substantial form, a perceived 
object becomes a familiar known thing. Stephen describes the mind as being “arrested” by 
quidditas in the same way physiologists halt an animal’s heartbeat with the insertion of a needle 
(187-88). The suggestion here seems to be that the mind naturally moves from one thought to 
another in a peripatetic manner, but this natural movement comes to an abrupt stop when an 
essence is perceived that holds the mind’s focus. An object’s essence exerts a hold on the mind 
when its wholeness or harmony fascinates the mind. This arrest, or “stasis,” Stephen describes as 
“silent,” suggesting that the mind is enraptured and mute (187). 
The Final Stage of Ecstatic Stasis 
The three stages of apprehension described by Stephen seem to articulate more 
thoroughly the stages sketched in the Pola notebook. Each state is differentiated and, most 
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important, the mysterious third phase, which was described merely as satisfaction, is more fully 
explained as the perceptual phase in which the mind becomes momentarily transfixed by the 
contemplation of a particular quidditas. While such contemplation retains an element of mystery, 
Joyce’s larger point, that aesthetic experience strangely prevents us from seeking anything 
beyond the experience itself, seems intuitively sound. In fact, beauty’s hold upon us is at times 
so powerful that we feel ourselves incapacitated, momentarily unable to redirect our attention, 
move, or, in extreme cases, speak. At these moments, the object of our perception has a sort of 
magic hold upon us. We often describe this unusual state by saying we are enchanted, transfixed, 
spellbound, even dumbstruck. 
While many writers look to nature for examples of such ecstasy, Joyce focuses instead on 
stasis achieved through artifice. In the Paris notebook, he writes that natural objects, however 
intrinsically pleasing and hence beautiful, cannot be considered art. Art, he states, is the “human 
disposition of sensible or intelligible matter for an aesthetic end” (“Aesthetics” 145). Thus, a 
work of art must be deliberately created by persons for the express purpose of bringing about a 
moment of ecstatic satisfaction. We may find beauty in nature, but art is located exclusively in 
the human world. Taking the term “disposition” to mean something roughly like an orderly 
arrangement or design, Joyce makes it clear that art is a deliberate human creation. In this 
respect, anything occurring naturally or created by humans as a part of a natural process cannot 
be considered art. Joyce underscores this point in the Paris notebook by stating that excrement, 
children, and lice cannot be considered art (146). Presumably, lice cannot be considered art 
because they are not produced by humans, while excrement and children are rejected because 
they result from natural rather than artificial human processes. Because of their intended 
purpose, objects created for non-aesthetic ends similarly cannot be considered art. Joyce 
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emphasizes this point by considering the pleasing image of a cow accidently created by a man 
hacking at wood. Though the object may have certain aesthetic qualities, it cannot be considered 
art, he writes, because the man did not intend to create an aesthetic object or indeed any 
recognizable object (146). In a similar vein, beautiful houses, clothing, and furniture, though 
clearly the result of artificial processes, cannot be considered art unless created with an aesthetic 
end in mind (146). 
For Joyce then, art intentionally seeks to recreate by artificial means the ecstatic stasis 
that is often experienced in our perception of the natural world. Because such satisfaction derives 
from the perception of substantial forms in nature, artists skillfully copy natural subjects more or 
less faithfully to deliberately reproduce, oftentimes even enhance, our perceptual pleasure. 
Though the perception of such subjects is pleasing as a whole, it is the enraptured contemplation 
of their quidditas that offers us the greatest satisfaction and chiefly accounts for their aesthetic 
quality. 
Pragmatic Mimesis 
Given that art seeks to recreate by artificial means the ecstatic stasis often experienced in 
nature, the extent that art involves mimesis becomes clear. Unlike Plato, who held that objects 
were mere copies of universal forms, the scholastic tradition that Joyce defends maintains that 
objects actually embody substantial form or quidditas. Thus, unlike Plato’s craftsmen who could 
only copy the copy of a form, craftsmen as well as poets could, on Joyce’s view, instantiate 
actual essences by producing particular things that have an embodied form. Artists could even 




Although any instance of a thing embodies a unique form, certain things, especially 
complex human actions, are, as stated, often difficult to grasp. The causes as well as the 
consequences of such actions may, for example, be so enormous that they exceed our 
understanding. Artists are, however, remarkably skilled at arranging their material so as to 
minimize obscuring accidents. Consequently, they are able to produce remarkably clear 
renderings of difficult subjects. In brief, artists are able to thoughtfully craft instances of their 
subjects that allow the quidditas to shine forth. On this view, art is not necessarily mimetic. 
Artists do not seek to copy essences, as Plato suggested, they instantiate essences. Because, 
however, copying a particular subject is the most expedient way to instantiate that subject’s 
quidditas, artists often resort to copying merely as a practical matter. Thus, art frequently uses 
mimesis in order to achieve its end. Because artists do not need to be faithful to any particular 
subject in order to instantiate its universal essence, however, they are entirely free to strip away 
as much intruding detail as possible so as to produce a perfectly illustrative example.  
The clearest practical expression of this position is Aristotle’s Poetics, in which he states 
that in order to present complex human actions effectively poets may borrow from actual events 
but must carefully reshape these events so that the quidditas is revealed more clearly and 
powerfully than it is in nature. Thus, the playwright is advised to borrow from actual historical 
events only as an expedient way of crafting an especially illustrative instance of human action. In 
short, the artist’s task is to exceed, through a combination of knowledge and skill, the revelatory 
power of nature.15 In this respect, artists, unlike historians, are required not only to make careful 
observations of nature, but to reflect on these observations so that the “universal” nature of what 
is perceived comes to be fully understood. Only after artists have separated the accidental from 
                                                 
15 See Aristotle’s description of the poet in contrast to the historian (65-66). 
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the essential can they carefully craft the perfect illustration of the subject, purified of distorting 
features. Artists must be skilled observers of the natural world, but, more significantly, they must 
come to know their subject with great intimacy so that they can reveal it clearly to their audience. 
In this respect, Aristotle writes, poetry is more “philosophical and significant” than other forms 
of imitation (65). 
Once the subject is fully known, there remains only the practical difficulty of determining 
how it can be best instantiated. On Aristotle’s view, such matter-of-fact decisions are principally 
questions of technique.16 What, for example, is the best arrangement of incidents? What kind of 
character would be appropriate to the subject? What sort of dialogue would fit the occasion? 
Which words and phrases would be interesting but universally understandable? In making such 
decisions, artists, while borrowing from actual events, need not be slavishly faithful to their 
inspiration. In fact, if the subject is complex, artists should not merely copy nature because the 
results of doing so would almost inevitably be unclear and hence unsatisfying. Rather, artists 
should take liberties with their material so that they can enable the essence or quidditas to appear 
with remarkable clarity. As Aristotle writes, poets should “not seek to cling exclusively to the 
stories that have been handed down,” for the poet’s task is to describe things “as they might 
possibly occur,” not “as they actually happened” (66, 65). With this creative license, the poet’s 
work may look, at times, like a direct attack on mimesis. 
At what point does art inspired by life become so significantly altered that it can no 
longer be considered mimetic in any real sense? Might an artist even reject representation in 
order to better instantiate some concept? Joyce’s aesthetic writing, like that of his mentors, seems 
                                                 
16 By far, the bulk of Aristotle’s Poetics is concerned with technique, principally plot development. 
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to leave open just this possibility and, in doing so, pave the way for a strikingly iconoclastic 
work such as Ulysses. To capture Dublin at the beginning of a new century, a writer could 
simply record the events of a particular day, but such a record might prove misleading. 
Accidental details might obscure the day’s larger significance or, worse yet, suggest some 
falsehood. To ensure that the quidditas shines forth, Aristotle urges artists to take liberties with 
their material, primarily stripping away extraneous and confusing details, but such a “perfect” 
representation presents its own, less obvious dangers. Every object, not matter how well crafted, 
is an amalgam of essence and accident. Even a perfect representation is open to 
misunderstanding, perhaps more so given the absence of obvious irrelevancies. If even a work of 
impeccable craftsmanship can be deceptive, is it possible to reveal essence in representation 
without the danger of misinterpretation? This is the driving question that sets the stage for the 




To speak as Plato about the spirit and the good is, however, to make truth stand on its head and 
deny the perspectival, the fundamental condition of life itself. 
--Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse [Beyond Good and Evil] (Preface) 
The Challenge of Relativity 
During a leisurely stroll down Westmoreland Street, Leopold Bloom is confronted by the 
unsettling notion of relativity. As he approaches the southern end of the O’Connell Bridge, he 
looks up at the Ballast Office and sees that the time ball has been lowered indicating that 
“Dunsink time” is now past one in the afternoon (126). The Ballast Office, owned and occupied 
by the Dublin Port authorities, was a well-known landmark because of the prominent clock 
positioned just above the main entrance. The clock, long considered to be the most accurate in 
Dublin, was connected to the Dunsink Observatory four miles north of the city center by means 
of telegraph cable and displayed the exact solar time as established at Dunsink. A time ball was 
later added to the building and lowered each afternoon at exactly one (Scott 9). Though the 
lowered time ball appears to announce the arrival of afternoon with incontestable authority, 
Bloom returns to the question of time after a series of related speculations. The first-story clock, 
not the time ball, is connected to the Dunsink Observatory, he recalls. The time ball is instead 
connected to the observatory in Greenwich, London, which is located three hundred miles 
southeast. Thus, he concludes, the Ballast Office simultaneously indicates two slightly different 
times, Dunsink and Greenwich, as the precise time in Dublin. To complicate matters, since both 
observatories are located at a distance from the Ballast Office, neither indicates the exact solar 
time at this location (137). Strangely, Bloom’s attempts to fix the time with scientific accuracy 
have only underscored its relative nature.  
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Realism and its Critics 
Though strains of relativism can be traced back to ancient times, the concept of relativity 
began to capture the popular imagination during the latter part of the nineteenth century as 
increasing contact with non-Western people cast doubt on the customs, morals, and religious 
assumptions that had long been considered the bedrock of Western civilization (Gowans). In the 
early twentieth century, “radical thought” emerging from the natural sciences called into 
question the absolute nature of the physical world; even space and time were conceived as 
relative.17 As never before, the idea of an unchanging truth, a metaphorical North Star, seemed to 
be under attack. 
In literature, the challenge of relativism presented itself as a thorough critique of realism. 
The term “realism,” in its most general sense, refers to a style of art that attempts to faithfully 
represent what is thought to be “real” (Morris 4). What is considered real, however, turns out to 
be a complicated issue. Often, the world considered independent of any individual or social bias 
is thought to be “real.” In short, it is existence objectively conceived. Taken in this sense, realism 
can be viewed as an extension of Enlightenment thought. It assumes optimistically that the 
human mind is capable of representing the world as it is in itself in much the same way that a 
mirror is capable of faithfully reflecting its surroundings (Morris 5).  
Though novelists such as Honoré de Balzac anticipated realism, the controversial work of 
mid-nineteenth century painters, particularly Gustave Courbet, brought public attention to the 
stylistic conventions that later characterized the work of British realists such as Thomas Hardy, 
Anthony Trollope, and George Eliot (Morris 63). Courbet, however, never explicitly formulated 
                                                 
17 For a detailed analysis of the growing relativity movement in natural science, which culminates in the work of 
Albert Einstein, see Christopher Herbert’s Victorian Relativity. 
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his realist technique. In fact, he considered his work to demonstrate a sort of cultivated 
artlessness that eschewed constraining formal conventions and dogmatic principles. Courbet 
steadfastly maintained that he was able to perfectly mirror the world because he contributed 
nothing to it from his imagination. When asked to paint an angel, Courbet famously replied, 
“I’ve never seen an angel. Show me an angel, and I’ll paint one” (Gardner 349). Despite the 
professed artlessness of his work, Courbet’s admirers were able not only to identify a replicable 
technique in his painting, but to codify his technique in a number of broadly applicable 
conventions. For example, Courbet and his contemporaries tended to depict subjects commonly 
considered ordinary, trivial, and even vulgar, often in explicitly contemporary settings (Gardener 
349). Their compositions were frequently informal and often appeared spontaneous, as though 
the subject was captured unawares (“Gustave”). Finally, these artists, perhaps influenced by 
empiricism, attempted to record ordinary experience with a seriousness previously reserved for 
religious or historical painting (Gardener 349). 
As the winning formula of realism was slavishly imitated, the style ironically came to 
appear labored, conventional, contrived, and even patently false. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, the “avant-garde” began to accuse realists of the sort of blindness that realists had 
themselves earlier associated with the status quo. These critics suggested that contemporary 
artists should strive to create a new art that was more faithful to lived experience. Such art, they 
proposed, should be based, not on formal conventions, but on an honest effort to directly capture 
the buzzing, booming, and unruly reality that constitutes modern life (Morris 14).  
This criticism is nowhere better expressed than in Virginia Woolf’s essay “Modern 
Fiction” (1921), in which she describes the previous generation of writers as being blinded by 
their own artistic preconceptions. While contemporary writers tirelessly labor to foster a 
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“likeness to life,” the very thing they are after has “moved off, or on and refuses to be contained 
in such ill-fitting vestments” (160). Conformity to established literary convention, she argues, 
has taken the form of a blind idolatry, and the methodology of realist fiction now serves as a 
“powerful and unscrupulous tyrant” preventing writers from addressing anything but the most 
insignificant aspects of life (160).  
Modernist critics such as Woolf make it clear that the conventions of realism are to be 
rejected, not because they are intended to convey what is considered “real,” but because they 
paradoxically achieve the opposite, concealment. In place of such conventions, Woolf 
recommends exactly what realist painters like Courbet had urged a half-century earlier, the 
wholehearted embrace of lived experience. If writers are to capture “life or spirit,” they must 
address a much broader range of experience, including the “trivial, fantastic,” and “evanescent” 
(160). In her plea for greater verisimilitude, Woolf even goes so far as to suggest that writers 
should confront difficult topics, including the “dark places of psychology” (162). 
What modernists like Woolf saw as artificial about the realist movement was its 
insistence upon an authoritative narrative that conforms to the conventions of traditional literary 
genres. For the most part, realist novels are presented from a single objective viewpoint. As such, 
the narrative is free of the prejudices that directly or indirectly distort the individual perspectives 
of actual persons. Such narrative authority reassures the reader that the events described took 
place in the exact way they have been depicted. There may be lingering doubts about the larger 
implications of a particular story but not about the story itself.  
Given that even the most admirable narrators are, to some extent, plagued by bias, 
however, it becomes obvious that the completely authoritative narrator of realist fiction is itself 
an imaginative fiction. In fact, the very term “perspective,” borrowed from the language of 
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vision, implies not simply limitations of sight, but, more important, the emotional and cognitive 
restrictions that obscure our understanding. In this regard, the authoritative perspective of realist 
fiction is actually a perspectiveless perspective: a view of events that is so absolutely expansive 
and complete that it cannot be considered a “view” in any conventional sense. If the 
perspectiveless perspective of realist fiction is not that of any actual or imagined person, how is 
it to be conceived? The only plausible answer is that it is the viewpoint of an all-knowing and 
completely neutral observer. As such, the omniscient third-person standpoint of realist fiction is 
a God-like perspective. Trying to convey God’s point of view is, however, a very difficult task, 
as modernist critics were quick to point out. Being human, the writer of realist fiction can convey 
the infinite only by means of the finite and so must pass off distortion as clarity. The realist can 
succeed only by tricking the reader into accepting personal prejudice as unquestioned truth. As 
the critics of Woolf’s generation began to ask more probing questions about contemporary 
fiction, the illusion of the perspectiveless perspective was forcefully brought to light. Was it 
possible that the events, which are so neatly laid out by the narrator like “a series of gig lamps 
symmetrically arranged,” did not occur just as they were described? Might the same events be 
described differently by other characters, perhaps even by the principal characters after time has 
passed (160)?  
If feigning an objective perspective only serves to conceal error, how can contemporary 
writers capture life as it is lived? Recognizing the contradictions involved in a perspectiveless 
perspective, the critics of realism suggested that writers should abandon their God-like vantage 
point and attempt instead to record faithfully the “myriad impressions” that ceaselessly bombard 
the mind, despite the “aberrations” and “complexity” these impressions might “display” (160). 
To faithfully portray such a multiplicity, novelistic conventions that had once seemed inviolable, 
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such as narrative focalization, reliability, and, most important, distance, must be sacrificed so 
that experience could speak for itself. As Woolf warns, such writing might be judged “difficult,” 
even “unpleasant” (161). Once we dispense with the conventions of objective narration, there is 
no longer any metanarrative to guide our interpretation. Differences of emphasis, even outright 
contradictions, make judging among alternative narratives difficult and, without an omniscient 
guide, there seems no obvious way of resolving these problems. The reader has seemingly been 
cast adrift in a sea of competing descriptions, and, thus, the relativity that pervades so much of 
modern life comes inextricably to haunt modern storytelling. In the absence of any fixed point of 
reference, all hope of finding truth in literature seems hopelessly lost. 
Parallax and Relativity 
As Bloom strolls down Grafton Street, still struggling with the problem of relativity, he 
considers a related term, parallax, which he dimly perceives as a solution to the problems posed 
by relativity. If he could only grasp the notion of parallax, he might understand how truth can be 
wrested from error. For a moment, Bloom considers visiting Professor Joly at the Dunsink 
observatory and asking for an explanation. He even considers “jollying up” the professor with 
flattering comments about his family. Predicting that the professor, insulted by his blunt 
questions, would quickly show him the door, Bloom hopelessly abandons the idea altogether 
(137).  
Though often associated with astronomy, parallax is generally defined as the difference 
in the apparent position of an object when viewed from alternate lines of sight. Despite the 
foreboding sound of this definition, the term, which comes from the ancient Greek word for vary 
or change, merely calls attention to the patently obvious fact that things appear differently when 
seen from different perspectives. Taken at face value, the notion of parallax seems only to 
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underscore the inescapable relativity of existence. The way things appear depends entirely on the 
vantage point of the viewer. Surprisingly, however, parallax enables us to arrive at objective 
knowledge.  
The most familiar example of how parallax is used to establish objective truth is depth 
perception. When viewed alternately with each eye, the same object appears to alter position 
somewhat because it is seen from slightly different angles. When we compare this difference or 
parallax, however, we are able to establish the location of the things we see. Nearby objects 
appear significantly different to each eye because the distance between eyes is considerable 
compared to the proximity of the object. Conversely, distant objects appear much alike because 
the distance between eyes is comparatively negligible. Though the perception of depth is largely 
unconscious, the early Greeks discovered how to use the same basic principles to calculate the 
distance of remote objects. By carefully measuring the angle to an object from two points along a 
known baseline, the distance to that object from each point could be conceived as the side of a 
giant triangle and calculated using the law of sine. This process, known as triangulation, can be 
used to calculate the height of large objects as well as the distance of far-away objects. As the 
process was refined over time it became essential to navigation, surveying, and cartography. 
Recently the same process has been used to determine the exact distance of astronomical objects 
such as nearby stars.  
Struggling to grasp the notion of parallax, Bloom’s thoughts turn to Robert Stawell Ball, 
former director of the Dunsink Observatory, and his popular astronomy treatise The Story of the 
Heavens (126). In this work, Ball describes how astronomers use measurements of parallax, 
much like engineers, to calculate the distance of remote celestial objects. Imagine, he writes, a 
distant planet like Venus as a strip of paper attached to a glass window through which it is 
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possible to see objects at a good distance. Viewed alternately with each eye, the strip’s position 
in contrast to the background will appear to vary more when it is near and less when it is distant. 
The same “principle” used to establish the distance of the paper strip, Ball writes, “when applied 
on a gigantic scale,” is used by astronomers to determine the position of heavenly bodies. For 
example, if we imagine the planet Venus as the strip of paper and the sun as the background seen 
through a window, we can assess the distance of Venus by comparing the difference between its 
positions relative to the sun as viewed from observatories located in alternate terrestrial 
hemispheres. In fact, when this difference is carefully observed and compared, it is possible to 
calculate the distance of Venus as well as other objects in our solar system with astonishing 
precision (151-53).  
Applying Professor Ball’s lesson about astronomical parallax to the challenges of modern 
literature, one might say that the principles used to calculate the distance of celestial objects 
could similarly be used to establish narrative truth. For the modern critic of realism, every 
narrative is open to genuine doubt. Thus, when there is only a single narrative, it is difficult to 
say which aspects of the story are true. Aside from internal inconsistencies and contradictions of 
established fact, there is nothing to which a story can be compared and evaluated. All that can be 
known for certain is that every narrative by its very nature is limited and hence, to a certain 
extent, erroneous. This is the problem readers have always faced when confronted with an 
unreliable narrator. What part of what the narrator says, if any, is true? When there is only one 
voice, it is impossible to say with any assurance, just as it is difficult to accurately judge the 
distance of an object with only one eye.  
But when there is an alternative perspective it becomes possible to discern areas of truth. 
Places where there is agreement can be considered more reliable. Areas of disagreement, on the 
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other hand, indicate where an account becomes problematic. Weighing narratives against one 
another in this manner thus endows the careful reader with a sort of binocular vision. Given that 
every perspective contains distortions of fact, comparing alternate narratives will never lead to 
absolute certainty, but it will indicate generally what is more or less probably true. The 
assessment of plausibility and, hence, probable truth is improved as more perspectives are 
compared and more agreement established. Thus, just as spatial distortions, when compared, 
enable us to determine distance, narrative distortions, when contrasted, enable us to establish 
truth. In short, a single perspective is always distorted and hence unreliable, but multiple 
perspectives, despite individual distortions, enable the reader to ascertain places of agreement 
and disagreement and, hence, probable truth. 
At this point, one might suggest that by comparing perspectives it would be possible to 
arrive at a truth that could then be communicated in the form of a reliable objective narrative. 
This is much like the strategy Aristotle recommends in Poetics and the sort of project proposed 
by the realists. That is, artists should examine the subject to be portrayed, separate accident from 
essence, and then create the best possible illustration of the subject’s essence. The goal should be 
an especially clear example in which accidental features have been kept to an absolute minimum 
so that the essence of the subject shines forth much more clearly than in nature. As critics point 
out, however, the problem with this sort of mimesis is that every work of art is an amalgamation 
of matter and form, and hence a mixture of accident and essence. There is the ever-present 
danger that an audience will mistake merely contingent properties for necessary ones. Or, to say 
the same thing in the language of the realists, there is the unavoidable possibility that distortions, 
which are an inevitable part of the realist’s purported God-like stance, will be taken as infallible 
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truth. Such misimpressions, which are, for example, often deliberately encouraged in commercial 
advertising, may well have disastrous consequences when used as a guide for moral action.  
Instead of trying to minimize narrative distortions or falsely to present a distorted 
narrative as undistorted, writers could take inspiration from the application of parallax and offer 
their readers a sort of binocular vision. That is, writers could present their subject from multiple 
standpoints so that these perspectives could be compared and truth ascertained. This is the sort of 
approach suggested by repeated references to parallax in Ulysses, and it goes a long way toward 
explaining the profusion of perspectives that the novel embraces. The events of 16 June 1904 are 
not singularly conveyed but emerge from the various voices directly and indirectly involved. 
The Binocular Perspective of Ulysses 
Given that the events of Ulysses could be told in innumerable ways, establishing a sort of 
binocular vision in the novel is much more complex than simple triangulation. To create a form 
of literary parallax, Joyce juxtaposes alternate narrators as well as distinct literary genres and 
styles, at times in rapid succession. In addition to the initial narrative style, which has been 
roughly described as free indirect discourse, the novel includes multiple first-person narrators, 
including Stephen, Bloom, and Molly, who are clearly identified with characters in the novel.18 
Other narrators, such as the speaker in “Cyclops,” are not associated with any known character 
though they often give the impression of representing persons involved in the dramatic action. 
Most episodes maintain the same narrator throughout, but some episodes, such as “Nausicaa,” 
have more than one narrator. In addition to alternative narrators, Joyce contrasts various literary 
                                                 
18 Though approximating free indirect discourse, the initial style is perhaps more precisely described as a “blend” of 




genres. Just as it is often difficult to identify Joyce’s narrators, however, it is similarly hard to 
identify the target of his parodies. In his discussion of voices in Ulysses, Weldon Thornton 
suggests that “Nausicaa” parodies romance novelettes; “Eumaeus,” expository prose; “Aeolus,” 
journalese; “Ithaca,” scientific writing; “Sirens,” musical prose; “Cyclops,” first-person narration 
and satire; “Scylla and Charybdis,” drama; and, finally, “Penelope,” internal monologue (102, 
106, 109, 113, 117, 123-124, 129, 131). Though these associations are fairly typical, other critics 
have proposed alternative as well as additional targets of parody.19 Alongside various literary 
genres, Joyce mimics the literary styles associated with historical periods and well-known 
authors. The most dramatic example is, without doubt, “The Oxen of the Sun,” which describes 
the events surrounding Mina Purefoy’s labor and delivery in styles associated with familiar 
literary periods and major literary figures. The episode begins with a Latinate call to the Holles 
Street maternity hospital followed by a prayer for the arrival of Mrs. Purefoy’s child in language 
borrowed from the Rosary (Cowan). Often imitating specific authors, the episode follows the 
meandering course of the English language from Anglo-Saxon verse through to an incoherent 
rendition of contemporary American slang.20 
Though the profusion of narrators, genres, and styles may, at times, seem disorienting, 
each voice brings to the forefront distinct elements that are neglected, sometimes eclipsed, by 
other narratives. Even voices characterized by prejudice and hate have their place in the larger 
portrait, calling attention to unpleasant, often overlooked realities alongside blatant falsehoods. 
The individual perspectives expressed by these voices make it clear that form is inseparable from 
                                                 
19 For a detailed discussion of the alternatives, see Thornton, Voices, 101-33. 
20 Don Gifford and Robert J. Seidman identify many of the stylistic shifts in their chapter on “The Oxen of the Sun” 
in Ulysses Annotated: Notes for James Joyce's Ulysses (407-49). 
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content. Each character, genre, and style seems uniquely capable of revealing significant truths 
about the world but only by simultaneously concealing other equally valuable insights. Given the 
wealth of voices that dovetail, overlap, and echo one another, any attempt to neatly catalogue the 
perspectives sounded in Ulysses seems impossible and even ultimately undesirable. Certain 
voices clearly stand out, such as those of Stephen and Bloom, but they are counterbalanced by 
other voices—for example, Buck Mulligan’s—so that no single speaker carries complete 
narrative authority. Just as our perception of distance is largely intuitive, Joyce’s assumption 
seems to be that the recognition of truth may occur without the conscious analysis and 
comparison of alternative narratives. In this regard, discerning narrative truth seems more akin to 
depth perception than triangulation. It is immediate and intuitive, though a deliberate weighing 
of narratives is required in certain instances. Especially problematic passages, for example, may 
demand more painstaking efforts, refined techniques of analysis.  
The absence of any definitive narrative voice seems to put Ulysses at odds with the 
realists and, more broadly, the tradition of art as mirroring, but this is not the only (or even the 
most plausible) way of understanding the novel. Joyce’s writing on aesthetics, which borrows 
heavily from Aristotle, places him clearly within the mimetic tradition at the beginning of his 
career. Considering the turbulent events of the early twentieth century, especially the First World 
War, an event that began just as Joyce was starting Ulysses, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
the author abandoned a tradition widely seen as given birth to this horrific conflict. Apart from 
stylistic changes, however, there is no indication that Joyce rejected his earlier views on 
aesthetics. Rather than rejecting mimesis altogether, Joyce may have conceived of his novel as 
revising the tradition to avoid what had become its all-too-apparent dangers. Perhaps it is not 
mimesis that stirs nations to war but rather traditional methods of mirroring.  
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The Dangers of Monocular Narratives 
Despite antecedents dating back to ancient times, political propaganda is widely 
considered to be a modern phenomenon largely dependent upon systems of mass communication 
developed in the late nineteenth century (Messinger 1-2). By the advent of the First World War, 
propaganda techniques and even theories of their effective use had been established and shown 
to be highly effective.21 At the outset of the war, the principal nations involved launched 
unprecedented campaigns to bolster support for their respective causes. To a great extent these 
movements were built upon nineteenth-century ideologies of imperialism that had been 
promoted largely by private sector interests (Messinger 13-14). However, unlike previous 
attempts to influence public opinion, these new campaigns made coordinated use of new forms 
of popular media, including posters, leaflets, pamphlets, newsreels, and radio broadcasts, as well 
as both popular and scholarly books and articles. For the first time, it appeared that the arts, taken 
broadly, were able to determine the fortunes of nations and, consequently, the course of history.  
Even with considerable competition, the British propaganda campaign quickly outpaced 
its rivals with regard to the quality of material, and its influence was felt both at home and 
abroad (Johnson).  On the heels of declaring war, the British government sought to coordinate 
efforts by establishing a bureau of propaganda and naming the well-connected journalist Charles 
Masterman as its head. Versed in the effective use of media, Masterman immediately set out to 
                                                 
21 Most of the techniques associated with the propaganda campaigns of the early twentieth century, such as the use 
of handbills, posters, and newspaper advertisements, were developed by marketers in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century. As the effectiveness of these techniques became undeniable, the manipulation of public opinion gained 
increasing scholarly attention. See, for example, Gustave Le Bon's The Crowd (1897), J. A. Hobson's The 
Psychology of Jingoism (1901), and Graham Wallas's Human Nature and Politics (1908). 
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solicit contributions from persons considered at the time to be the most prominent writers in 
Britain.22 Their mission was to generate support for the war, primarily among Allied and neutral 
nations (Messinger 34). Many of the writers solicited, such as Thomas Hardy, were associated 
with the realist movement and some, such as H. G. Wells, Arnold Bennett, and John Galsworthy, 
were explicitly singled out by Virginia Woolf in her criticism of contemporary literature (158). 
Notably absent were members of the Bloomsbury Circle like Woolf herself (Messinger 34). By 
any standard, the bureau’s output was astonishing. In its first year of operation alone, the bureau 
reported producing over two and a half million written documents, many of which were further 
reprinted by unaffiliated organizations (Messinger 40). The overall effectiveness of British 
propaganda made the power of artists, especially writers, to influence human fate undeniably 
clear. Artists, who had once been viewed by many as the wellspring of culture, or even its 
salvation, were now seen as helping to foment unimaginable carnage on a global scale. Their 
power derived from their ability to present a single perspective in a manner that appeared free of 
distortion and, thus, make questionable assertions appear to be indisputable fact. The more 
convincingly writers feigned omniscience, the more effectively they manipulated their audience. 
The dangers of the Aristotelian tradition were now all too horrifyingly apparent.  
Having lived through the unparalleled horrors of the First World War, Joyce would have 
been all too familiar with the notion of a totalizing narrative and the violence such narratives 
encourage. In Ulysses, such a monocular narrative and its perils are best represented by the 
character referred to only as “the Citizen” from the Cyclops episode. An ardent Irish nationalist, 
the Citizen is utterly incapable of seeing the world from an alternative perspective or even 
                                                 
22 Aside from being well versed in politics and journalism, Masterman wrote on the manipulation of public opinion. 
See Chapter Four of his The Condition of England. 
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entertaining issues unrelated to his principal concern, the Irish cause. His concern for Ireland 
expresses itself chiefly in a blinding hatred of the English, a topic to which he returns repeatedly, 
almost obsessively. Unwilling even to consider what constitutes an Englishman, the Citizen 
lumps persons of foreign origin and Irishmen of foreign ancestry, such as Bloom, together with 
the traitorous English.  
The danger associated with the Citizen’s totalizing perspective is suggested throughout 
the episode by repeated references to grotesque acts of violence, often motivated by intolerance 
and bigotry. During the episode, the denizens of Barney Kiernan’s pub discuss a number of 
topics, including a hangman’s letters, a boxing match, a Southern lynching, Congolese atrocities, 
naval punishments, and anti-Semitism, all while Bob Doran, a drunk, repeatedly tries to provoke 
a fight (146-50, 261-62, 269, 274, 269-70, 273, 246-48). As if to underscore these suggestions, 
the episode ends as the Citizen unleashes his menacing dog, Garryowen, on Bloom and throws 
an empty biscuit tin at him while angrily shouting anti-Semitic epithets (282).  
Though it may seem deeply unfair to lay blame for the violence of the early twentieth 
century on Aristotle and his followers, it is undeniable that those directly or indirectly identified 
with this tradition played a large part in spreading an ideology of hate across the globe. As 
Aristotle asserted, matter and form, accident and essence, are inextricably linked.23 For this 
reason, there is always the possibility that an artist’s purportedly ideal representation may 
intentionally or unintentionally mislead. Given this danger, many twentieth-century artists, such 
as the German expressionists, explicitly rejected mimesis following the war in a conscious effort 
                                                 
23 Aristotle makes this point in numerous places, for example in the Metaphysics where he argues that, although 
predication necessarily involves an essence, if we were to strip away accidental qualities nothing would remain 
(Metaphysics, Book 7, Part 3). 
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to avoid what they perceived as the “trap of naturalism” (Willette). Rather than discarding 
mimesis entirely, however, Joyce might have realized that the threat of representation lies only in 
presenting partial narratives as though they were complete. The truth can be revealed though 
mimesis but only when multiple perspectives are provided. Art, Aristotle claims, is concerned 
with the universal. Thus, it is of special importance in revealing the universal nature of complex 
moral actions that are often hard to discern in practice (Poetics 65).  In Ulysses, Joyce, too, 
seems to be interested in revealing complex moral truths, specifically about the role of the artist 
and, more generally, the hero in the modern world. Such truths, however, cannot be expressed by 
means of a supposedly flawless ideal without the possibility of misunderstanding or outright 
manipulation. The unavoidable distortions of each individual representation must be tempered by 
those of alternative representations. The powerful propaganda campaigns that gave birth to 
global conflict illustrate what can occur when such narratives are not balanced. 
With obvious references to seminal works of Western literature, such as the Odyssey and 
Hamlet, Ulysses stridently asserts its place within the tradition of mimesis, but, at the same time, 
the iconoclastic proliferation of voices announces that, in significant ways, the novel departs 
from this same tradition. As hard as one tries, Joyce’s novel stubbornly refuses to be reduced to a 
final authoritative narrative. Even the perspectives of the novel’s protagonists, though at times 
sympathetic and persuasive, are repeatedly undercut by alternate voices that are, to varying 
degrees, antagonistic, considerate, disinterested, or simply concerned about altogether other 
matters. By stubbornly refusing any definitive final word, Joyce ensures that his text will not be 
eclipsed by simple interpretations that overlook actual hesitations, ambiguities, disagreements, 
and outright contradictions. The novel’s events take place in Dublin, but, simultaneously, they 
echo events in the ancient world and elsewhere in the modern world, and, at the same time, none 
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of these places precisely. The novel’s protagonists are portrayed as artists, heroes, saviors, but 
they are also arguably presented as the opposite. The point is not to conflate real differences but 
to show that, in reality, nothing is as one-dimensional as it is often portrayed. Only from a certain 
light does Dublin, a relative backwater compared to other European cities, appear as the center of 
Western Civilization. And only in an even more peculiar light do two public fools seem to be 




… nothing is more common than to have two Men tell the same story quite differing from one 
another, yet both of them eye-witnesses to the Fact related. 
-- Daniel Defoe (Preface to The Storm) 
Reimagining Narrative 
Ulysses is a novel overflowing with voices. The notion of astronomical parallax, which 
recurs throughout the text, hints at how these voices are to be understood. The suggestion is that, 
while individual narrative perspectives are unavoidably distorted, clarity can be achieved by 
comparing viewpoints. Though the comparison of perspectives has proven useful in science and 
engineering, at the time Joyce wrote Ulysses there were few parallels in literature. The closest 
analogue would be epistolary works, which date back at least as far the novel, arguably earlier. 
Such works incorporate documents, usually letters, often written by two or more characters, and 
frequently establish distinct perspectives on the same events. In fact, the appeal of the epistolary 
novel lies largely in the contrasting emotional outlooks. Despite similarities to Ulysses, there is, 
however, an important difference. Contrasting perspectives in epistolary novels enliven 
narrative, but there is no indication that the same story could not be told using some other 
narrative form.  In Ulysses, by contrast, the perspectival form of the novel seems inextricably 
connected to its subject matter. Telling the story from a single standpoint, Joyce suggests, would 
be to engender misunderstanding and violence. 
At first glance, the idea that truth can be grasped only by comparing alternate, at times 
conflicting, perspectives seems counterintuitive. Works of fiction are, generally, narrated from a 
single, consistent perspective intended to offer an altogether reliable description of events. 
Works of nonfiction, by contrast, routinely offer multiple, often contrasting, perspectives in the 
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form of primary sources, materials that have not been condensed, interpreted, or evaluated 
(“Primary”). Familiar examples include excerpts from a speech, eyewitness accounts, and expert 
testimony. Primary sources are considered essential because there is suspicion that secondary 
texts, works that build upon primary sources, unintentionally make misleading suggestions. In 
developing secondary narratives, writers working with primary texts cannot help but add 
information. Personal biases, professional assumptions, individual affections, even subtle 
differences in an author’s tone, can lead to significant misunderstanding. To forestall such 
misinterpretation, primary sources are routinely incorporated within or presented alongside 
secondary material.  
The first extended work of journalism, Daniel Defoe’s The Storm, is an early and 
influential example of the use of primary sources (Miller). To chronicle the tempest of 1703, 
Defoe solicited eyewitness accounts of the storm and its aftermath, which he published alongside 
his own observations. Though Defoe could have synthesized these accounts in a stylistically 
superior secondary narrative, he states in the preface that the dangers of speaking for others are 
too great.  A “prodigious looseness of pen” led writers of the past to mix “history and fable” so 
that today “nothing” is known about antiquity that can be “depended upon” with certainty (5). 
Fearing that he too might unconsciously blend fact and fantasy, Defoe decided to allow his 
witnesses to testify directly about the storm despite regrettable lapses of “stile” (8). In this sense, 
The Storm, which was read and greatly admired by Joyce, appears to be a very early forerunner 
of the perspectival approach that Joyce develops in Ulysses. 
The Great Storm of 1703 
Though the British notoriously complain about the weather, the climate in the British 
Isles, especially the southern part of England, is exceptionally mild. Situated at roughly the same 
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latitude as Moscow, the Gulf Stream bathes the British Isles in warm water from the Gulf of 
Mexico that moderates the temperature. Because of their proximity to the Atlantic Ocean, the 
British Isles often experience higher than normal winds, but such winds are seldom experienced 
inland. Severe windstorms, on the other hand, are quite rare (“UK Climate”). Because of cool 
ocean temperatures, Britain does not experience tropical cyclones, though occasionally the 
remnants of hurricanes formed in the tropics have been known to blow through the British Isles. 
These extra-tropical cyclones, as they are called, can cause widespread destruction and, in some 
instances, the loss of life, but they are a relatively rare occurrence (Burton). 
Given the mild climate, Londoners had no reason to suspect anything out of the ordinary 
when wind speeds increased rapidly on the afternoon of November 24, 1703. Though winds had 
blown “exceeding hard” for much of the month, Defoe writes, the day was considered “fair” for 
that time of year (26). Even when rainsqualls began to blow early in the evening, there was still 
no reason to expect anything more than the sort of wet weather typical of the season. 
Customarily, autumn is a period of unsettled weather in the British Isles and mild rains, even 
brisk gales, are common (Dutton). The Grote Mandrenke, meaning “great drowning of men,” 
which swept across the British Isles in 1362, had faded from public memory, and there had been 
relatively few other windstorms of great magnitude that might hint at the possibility of extreme 
weather (Moss). Over the next couple of days, however, the winds steadily increased, causing 
widespread damage. Tiles were blown off rooftops, chimneys were blown down, trees were 
uprooted, and “several ships were lost” (26). Daniel Defoe, who at the time lived in a “well built 
brick house” on the outskirts of London, reported having “narrowly escap’d the mischief of a 
part of a house” that collapsed on the first night of winds (30, 26).  
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Just as the winds might have been expected to subside, Defoe and others throughout the 
British Isles witnessed a strange and deeply ominous sign. Around ten o’clock on Friday 
evening, a startlingly low reading was observed on the barometer, a reading so low, in fact, that 
Defoe noted that the mercury appeared “lower than ever I had observ’d it on any occasion 
whatsoever.” The reading was so seemingly anomalous that Defoe even began to suspect that his 
barometer had been “handled and disturbed by the children” (26). The winds remained constant 
over the next couple of hours, but at midnight the dreadful tempest predicted by the barometer 
made its presence known. In a matter of hours, the winds grew to such a pitch that “few people” 
with any “sense of danger,” Defoe recounts, could have been so “hardy” as to remain asleep. At 
every moment, people expected their homes to collapse, burying them alive. Though remaining 
inside seemed certain death, Defoe writes, few dared to go outside because “the bricks, tiles, and 
stones from the tops of the houses flew with such force and so thick in the streets that no one 
thought it fit to venture out” (30). In the early morning hours, the winds reached the height of 
their ferocity and everyone feared that, at last, the end had finally arrived. Only a few hours later, 
however, the winds abruptly abated without explanation. The storm had miraculously ended. 
Upon venturing outside after the bulk of the storm had passed, witnesses described the 
damage as utterly incredible. Most regrettable of all, Defoe writes, were injuries, often fatal, 
caused by falling debris, especially crumbling chimneystacks. In addition to his own description 
of a collapsing chimney, which “gave” his home “such a shock” that he believed it to be giving 
way, Defoe collected testimony from many who witnessed the injury, even death, of persons 
crushed by chimney stacks (30). Aside from serious injuries caused by debris, Defoe describes 
almost inconceivable physical devastation, including innumerable buildings, walls, fences, and 
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steeples flattened by hurricane force winds. The number of uprooted trees was so enormous that 
Defoe, traveling in the country only a short time later, gave up trying to estimate it (55-56).  
Though the storm’s devastation on land was terrible, its effects at sea were considerably 
worse. At the outset of the storm, both inbound and outbound vessels from many nations were 
forced to the British coast and took refuge alongside ships already crowded into ports and rivers. 
Even in such safe harbors, however, ships were torn from their anchors by storm winds and 
either sunk or blown out to sea, never to be heard from again. Compared to roughly over a 
hundred persons killed on land, it has been estimated that many thousands lost their lives at sea. 
Historians generally reckon the actual number to be around eight thousand (“The Great Storm”). 
Most telling is Defoe’s emotional description of over seven hundred wrecked ships piled 
together pell-mell along a stretch of the River Thames commonly referred to as the London Pool 
(33-34). 
Defoe’s Inspiration for The Storm 
While an undeniable tragedy, The Great Storm proved to be a saving opportunity for 
Defoe. He had two weeks earlier been released from Newgate Prison, where he was incarcerated 
for seditious libel. Having published around forty pamphlets before running afoul of the 
authorities, Defoe was a well-known pamphleteer. The bulk of his writing consisted of polemical 
essays defending Dissenters and their allies. His best-known pamphlet, A True-Born Englishman 
(1701), defended King William, who had usurped the throne from his father-in-law, James II. 
Being of Dutch descent and, in a sense, a foreign invader, William was unable to gain popular 
acceptance. Coming to William’s defense, Defoe persuasively argued that the notion of a pure-




Though A True-Born Englishman was generally well received, Defoe’s subsequent 
essays were more partisan in tone. As a result, he made a number of enemies who patiently 
awaited the chance to get even (Backscheider 81-83). This moment arrived in 1702, when Queen 
Anne assumed the throne and directed public animosity towards Dissenters, like Defoe, who had 
been protected by her predecessor. Seeking to temper public hostility, Defoe published The 
Shortest-Way with the Dissenters (1702), which parodied a fanatical clergyman hostile to 
Dissenters.  
Unlike his earlier parodies, however, The Shortest-Way was taken seriously by many who 
praised the fictional clergyman’s frank suggestion that Dissenters must be dealt with harshly. 
When it eventually became known that the pamphlet’s actual author was Daniel Defoe, a 
Dissenter and notorious pamphleteer, the writer’s enemies made sure that he was quickly 
charged with libel and imprisoned (Backscheider 98-100). On the advice of his lawyer, Defoe 
pled guilty and, along with three days in the pillory, was sentenced to Newgate Prison until the 
Queen was satisfied that he no longer constituted a threat to the public order. Realizing that 
Defoe would make a powerful ally if turned to their side, Defoe’s enemies kept him in prison 
until his spirits began to wane and, just as all hope seemed to vanish, released him on the 
assurance that he remain the Queen’s loyal servant in the future (Hamblyn xxi-xxii). With this 
promise, Defoe foreswore the sort of political pamphleteering for which he was best known, 
though he proudly arranged for publication of two collections of earlier pamphlets along with 
other miscellaneous writings. While the conditions of his release may have led Defoe to expect a 
position as apologist for his political adversaries, no such offers arose in the weeks following his 
release (Backscheider 139).  
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Not only did Defoe’s writing career appear to be at an end, but he had also lost his only 
reliable source of income, a brick and tile factory. As a child, Defoe had intended to become a 
minister but ultimately chose to pursue business like his father and quickly established himself as 
a seller of hosiery. This vocation gradually led to a series of increasingly outlandish ventures that 
were seldom profitable. In fact, Defoe’s growing debt and consequent desperation appear to have 
urged him to increasingly preposterous schemes, such as raising civet cats and recovering sunken 
treasure (Backscheider 56-57). Unlike most of his ventures, surprisingly, a masonry factory 
founded by Defoe on a piece of property in Essex became a reliable and much-needed source of 
income. A series of poor decisions made by Defoe’s employees while he was incarcerated, 
though, led to the factory’s failure shortly before his release. Its bankruptcy was particularly 
distressing, for it meant Defoe would be unable to obtain credit for any future business ventures. 
When Defoe returned home in early November, it appeared that his business career, much like 
his career as a pamphleteer, had come to an abrupt and irremediable end.  
The hurricane, however, offered new possibilities. Through he had pledged not to 
continue his polemical writing in a way that might harm the state, Defoe was free to write about 
subjects that had no political implication, and the storm presented a potentially profitable 
apolitical topic. Immediately seizing an opportunity to reverse his fortune, Defoe placed ads a 
few days after the storm in both the London Gazette and London Courant requesting first-hand 
accounts from reliable gentlemen (Hamblyn xxiii). His plan was to publish the correspondence in 
a profitable book. This approach had been attempted before with considerable success. The 
Anglican clergyman William Turner had placed similar advertisements in the London Gazette 
soliciting personal accounts of remarkable providences. The testimony received, alongside 
similar accounts drawn from published sources, was compiled in A Compleat History of the Most 
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Remarkable Providences. Defoe, who contributed to Turner’s collection, adopted the character 
of Turner’s ad in his own, and it is plausible to assume that works such as Turner’s directly 
inspired The Storm. Both works freely incorporate material from published sources as well as 
solicited correspondence, and both use this material as an earnest plea for spiritual repentance 
(Backscheider 142-43). There are, however, subtle but important differences between the 
collections that result equally from the particular subject of each work and its stated purpose.  
During the eighteenth century, like today, there was great popular interest in unusual 
phenomena, and periodicals such as John Dunton’s Athenian Mercury, which addressed quasi-
philosophical questions submitted by readers concerning strange occurrences including spiritual 
judgments, deliverances, and apparitions, were wildly successful (Backscheider 142). In order to 
capitalize on this interest, Turner, with the backing of Dunston, began compiling reports of 
remarkable events for A Compleat History. The accounts, amassed from a variety of sources, 
both ancient and contemporary, were divided into three sections (spiritual, natural, and artistic 
wonders) and reprinted, often verbatim, along with the names and titles of witnesses. Though the 
unusual nature of the phenomena described in the collection guaranteed popular interest, the 
collection was advertised as a “useful” resource for clergymen (Backscheider 142-43). Defoe’s 
interest in “extraordinary Deliverances,” as well as his extended discussions of their theological 
implications, suggests that he hoped to attract the same audience as Turner (Defoe 156). As 
indicated by the wording of his advertisement, Defoe, nevertheless, conceived of his collection 
primarily as historical rather than inspirational. The purpose of the proposed collection, Defoe 
writes, is to “preserve the remembrance of the late dreadful tempest” for posterity (Backscheider 
142). In keeping with this stated aim, Defoe repeatedly refers to himself in the text’s preface as a 
“historian” and disparages the fanciful work of ancient historians in contrast with his own (4, 6, 
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55). Defoe’s historical rather than religious emphasis gives The Storm a very different character 
from A Compleate History because Defoe understands his principal task as chronicling an 
important event rather than inspiring faith.  
In addition to divergent aims, the subject matter of each work gives rise to further 
important differences. Turner’s A Compleat History collects individual accounts of different 
phenomena. These phenomena, which are grouped together in categories such as good or bad 
apparitions, are each seldom witnessed by more than one person and, hence, are not open to 
contradiction. The Storm, on the other hand, collects individual accounts of the same 
phenomenon experienced at different times and places, raising questions of perspective that 
Turner’s work does not. A critic might challenge the veracity of one of Turner’s contributors but 
could not offer an alternative first-hand description of the same occurrence. Each contributor to 
The Storm, on the other hand, offers a supplemental account of the same event and, while these 
accounts are seldom contradictory, none can be considered definitive. It is the perspectival nature 
of The Storm that makes the work so distinctive. The great windstorm of 1703, was experienced 
by thousands of persons, each of whom was touched by the storm in some singular manner. Each 
Briton would, no doubt, describe the storm in slightly different terms, bringing to the fore those 
aspects of the event that stood out most in his or her memory at the time of recounting. Though it 
is tempting to look for the single most complete account of the storm, the sheer size of the 
hurricane makes it clear that no individual account can encompass the storm in its entirety, and, 
hence, the subject of Defoe’s collection brings directly before the reader the notion of the limits 
of description. The Storm makes clear that there are some things that grossly exceed narrative. 
Defoe’s Cacophonous Collection 
48 
 
The Storm opens with a scholarly discussion of winds and the origin of storms like the 
Great Storm of 1703. Following a general description of the cyclone based largely on his 
personal experience, Defoe devotes himself in the bulk of the work to chronicling the effects of 
the storm on land and sea. Being an “Eye-witness and sharer” of the storm’s effects in London, 
Defoe feels competent to describe the devastated city himself without citing additional 
“Testimony.” To “furnish the Reader” with an “authentick” description of the storm’s effects 
outside London, however, Defoe feels obliged to supplement his own description of events with 
first-hand accounts of those directly affected (64). As Defoe’s description of the storm’s 
devastation moves further from his direct experience, he comes increasingly to rely upon letters 
from contributors, which are organized by their descriptive content. Typically, Defoe introduces 
each section and letter, stating the author’s name, title, and location. His introductions often 
include a few words briefly summarizing a letter’s content. At times, Defoe feels compelled to 
comment upon an author’s style, or lack thereof, and vouch for his or her truthfulness; he notes 
correspondences between letters as well as published accounts. Only in the subsection describing 
damage to the Royal Navy does Defoe merely summarize accounts taken from published sources 
instead of quoting from letters. The assumption is that he did not receive firsthand testimony 
from persons in the navy and thus was forced to rely on public accounts (Defoe 148-49). 
Defoe assures his readers of the reliability of his eyewitnesses’ accounts, stating that they 
are taken from “gentlemen” of noted “piety and reputation.” These “gentlemen” submitted 
descriptions solely for the sake of posterity “without any private interest or advantage.” They 
have no “manner of motive” to “strain a tale beyond its real extent” (64). In the event that the 
disinterested nature of his witnesses is not itself sufficient to convince his readers, Defoe adds 
that each contributor gave permission to have his name and title printed alongside his 
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submission. Surely, Defoe urges, “without motion, hope, reward, or any other reason,” no one 
would acknowledge publicly passing an untruth on to posterity. With such assurances, Defoe 
asserts, the reader can unhesitatingly rely upon the truthfulness of his eyewitnesses (64-65).  
Having addressed the reader’s skepticism, Defoe explains that most letters are printed in 
full, although certain letters, which are “not concise enough to be printed as they are,” have been 
“digested into a relation only.” In such cases, Defoe assures the reader, the editors have “kept 
close to the facts of the matter” (65). The term Defoe uses here, “digest,” suggests a simple 
abridgment, but it remains unclear how this abbreviation has been achieved. Has Defoe merely 
excised chunks of text, leaving the printed passages intact, or has he edited, perhaps even 
rewritten, the printed sections? Furthermore, it is unclear which letters have been digested. The 
reader’s impression is that Defoe has omitted only sections he did not consider relevant to the 
topic at hand and that only a few of the letters have been significantly altered. As such, the 
reprinted accounts appear as verbatim transcriptions of whole letters or, at times, the majority of 
longer letters.  
For all Defoe’s warnings about lapses of style, the letters quoted are, for the most part, 
remarkably similar in wording and tone. Despite regular variation of salutation, the contents of 
each letter cataloguing the storm’s effects are strangely alike. Given that the letters were sent, 
purportedly, by persons from different regions, classes, and professions, the monotony of the 
letters is surprising. This similarity of style, among other factors, has led critics to suggest that 
Defoe authored, or at least heavily edited, many of the letters himself. Richard Hamblyn, for 
example, argues in his introduction to The Storm that there is good reason to doubt the 
authenticity of the letters. Defoe, Hamblyn writes, only once explicitly claims to reproduce a 
letter “verbatim” and then only when additional justification is demanded to explain the letter’s 
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“strange” and, by extension, unbelievable contents, a description of a small tornado that preceded 
the hurricane (xxviii).  
Defoe explicitly claims that the letter Hamblyn cites and the prior letter were reproduced 
exactly, and, given that these letters are the first two in the collection, readers would naturally 
assume that, in the absence of further comment, the subsequent letters are also faithfully copied 
(65). While Defoe does not use the term “verbatim” repeatedly, he uses similar words (such as 
“authentick”) that function much the same way. Hamblyn notes a letter from a sailor aboard a 
foundering ship that, he argues, indicates Defoe’s role in fabricating the letters. In addition to the 
repetition of dramatic phrases such as “all sunk and drowned,” there is the problem of explaining 
how a letter was delivered from a sailor aboard a sinking ship (xxix). Recognizing this problem, 
Defoe includes a postscript explaining that the letter was transferred to another ship while the 
tempest raged (132). Though the story of the letter’s miraculous transfer is not entirely 
convincing, the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the transfer do not necessarily indicate 
that the letter is a forgery, much less that all the printed letters were actually penned by Defoe. 
The Storm as Inspiration for Ulysses 
James Joyce was “a great admirer of Defoe.” He owned a multivolume set of Defoe’s 
writings and reportedly read “every line,” a boast he could make about only three other authors: 
Ben Jonson, Gustave Flaubert, and Henrik Ibsen (Budgen 186). In a 1912 lecture on Defoe at the 
Universita Popolare Triestina, Joyce explains his admiration, arguing that “the true English soul 
began to reveal itself in literature” only with the arrival of Defoe (6). Though preceded by 
Chaucer, Milton, and Shakespeare, Defoe was the first Englishman to write “without imitating or 
adapting foreign works.” Defoe “infused into the creatures of his pen a truly national spirit” that 
had never been given voice before. Most important, Joyce writes, Defoe “devised for himself an 
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artistic form” which was “without precedent.” In this respect, Defoe should be considered the 
“father of the English novel” (7). This lecture was part of a series on realism and idealism in 
British literature that Joyce gave shortly before he began Ulysses. The first section, on realism, is 
devoted entirely to Defoe. 
Joyce begins his lecture by acknowledging Defoe’s failings, including his lack of “love 
plot, psychological analysis, and the studied balance of characters and tendencies.” Despite these 
faults, Joyce writes, it is possible to glimpse in Defoe’s work the “modern realistic novel.” As a 
prime example of Defoe’s realism, Joyce cites The Storm. The narrative, he states, begins to 
emerge only after the introductory chapters. Like “a great snake,” it proceeds “to crawl slowly 
through a tangle of letters and reports,” which “follow one another interminably” (15). Joyce 
humorously captures the repetitive contents of these documents, which meticulously detail the 
number of trees uprooted, spires downed, fences toppled, and so forth. The contents, he 
confesses, prove “phenomenally boring,” but, he continues, “in the end the object of the 
chronicler is achieved.” “By dint of repetitions, contradictions, details, figures, noises,” Joyce 
concludes, “the storm has become alive, the ruin is visible” (16). 
Much of what Joyce says about The Storm could equally be said about Ulysses. Through 
the gradual accumulation of information, Joyce achieves a startlingly vivid portrait of Dublin and 
its denizens, and there is good reason to assume that Defoe’s work was a major stylistic 
influence. First, the focus of both works is deliberately narrowed so that events can be described 
in full. Most works of comparative length span an extended period of time and, for this reason, 
numerous events are depicted. The Storm, by contrast, focuses almost exclusively on the climax 
of the Great Storm, which occurred on the evening of November twenty-sixth. It was during this 
twelve-hour period that the brunt of the cyclone passed over the southern part of Britain, 
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inflicting the largest portion of the devastation. Defoe begins with his personal account of that 
dreadful night and then explores, by means of solicited letters, others’ experiences of that same, 
relatively brief period of time. Unlike Defoe’s storm, the events described in Ulysses are by no 
means extraordinary, but they transpire in a similarly short span of time, from approximately 
eight in the morning on June 16, 1904, to some time after four the following morning. In contrast 
to The Storm, which is organized principally by location, the events recounted in Ulysses are 
described chronologically although, in episode four, the morning’s events, originally described 
from Stephen’s perspective, are retold from Bloom’s point of view.  
Though never stated explicitly, the limited focus of each work appears motivated by a 
desire to portray events as accurately and fully as possible. This exhaustive depiction is achieved 
by incorporating copious factual information, which often seems unnecessary, even, at times, 
painfully gratuitous. In “Imagining Memory,” Diana Pérez García argues that Defoe was 
interested not merely in “constructing stories that resembled real life” but also in documenting 
“objective truth” (82). For this reason, she associates Defoe with the early empiricist tradition, 
proudly “reacting against previous ‘romantic’ ideological representations” without a healthy 
skepticism about limitations of the “new methodologies” (82). Defoe’s empiricism, she argues, 
explains the “immense body of factual detail, the long and exhaustive enumerations that 
distinguish his writings” (81). Such details are intended as empirical facts, open to verification 
by the reader. The profusion of such details, García argues, has often been dismissed merely as a 
stylistic blunder, which makes “the experience of reading Defoe much like reading evidence in a 
court of law” (Watt 34). García focuses on the use of inventorying, giving a detailed, itemized 
list, report, or record of things in one's possession, which can be found throughout Defoe’s 
writing but is most evident, she argues, in A Journal of the Plague Year (1722), a work, much 
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like The Storm, that is “swamped by fact and ciphers, researched by its author with painstaking 
dedication in the attempt at distilling his narrative out of hard facts” (81-82).  
Joyce, García points out, gathered facts with similar dedication in order to present an 
accurate portrayal of Dublin in Ulysses (86). Frank Budgen, a close friend of Joyce’s, observed 
that the author’s vivid description of Dublin emerges from painstaking research that was 
conducted while Joyce was living on the Continent. Joyce even confided to Budgen that “if the 
Dublin were to disappear from the earth,” he hoped “it could be recreated from the description in 
his book” (69). To achieve such a complete portrayal, Joyce proceeded meticulously, “like a 
ship’s officer taking the sun, reading the log, and calculating the current drift and leeway” 
(Budgen 123). Following Defoe, Joyce explicitly incorporates these details into his text so that 
his readers, if they are so inclined, can cross-check his facts against other sources. Such 
scrupulous attention to detail taxes Joyce’s readers with “a responsibility that would have been 
felt as quite inappropriate by the canonical realist writer” (85), García writes. It is partly for this 
reason that early critics such as D. H. Lawrence objected to what they perceived as the 
“journalistic” quality of Ulysses, the feeling that “even the smallest detail” was “deserving of 
posterity” (1075). Certainly, choosing which facts to include, which facts to emphasize, would 
have placed less responsibility on Joyce’s readers, resulting in a smoother narrative, but doing so 
would have projected the author onto the subject and, as Defoe expresses it, permitted 
“Romance” to “Trespass upon Fact” (6). 
In addition to extensive factual detail, the representation of events in both books is made 
more complete by the use of multiple perspectives. The juxtaposition of narrative correspondents 
in The Storm allows the reader to see the Great Storm unfold from alternative, often greatly 
diverse, standpoints. The “collector” functions somewhat like an authoritative narrator, 
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introducing and passing judgment on individual letters, but each of Defoe’s correspondents 
describes the storm from his own perspective, purportedly in his own words. Though, as Defoe 
himself points out, most of his correspondents are “gentlemen” of noted “piety and reputation,” 
there are letters from persons of varied background: scholars, clergymen, tradesmen, and sailors. 
Much of what these correspondents emphasize becomes repetitive, but each correspondent brings 
to the fore what he feels to be most relevant. Although there is not the stylistic diversity one 
might expect, the eyewitness testimony “heightens the sense of immediacy and crisis which so 
characterizes the atmosphere of the book” (Hamblyn xxviii). The reader relives the dreadful 
tempest with each eyewitness account. 
The voice of the “collector,” which often sets the context for supplemental voices in The 
Storm, is nowhere to be found in Ulysses, and the reader is left to drift among a chorus of 
narrators, who, though at times identifiable, are never explicitly identified.  Certain voices stand 
out among this collection, such as those of Stephen, Bloom, and Molly, but other voices, like the 
unnamed narrator of the “Cyclops” episode, cannot be identified with any known character. 
Focal changes often occur at the beginning of episodes, but the narrative voice may alter at any 
point without explicit warning, as in “Nausicaa.” Elements in the text, such as headlines in 
“Aeolus” and signs in “The Lotus Eaters,” appear to offer something like ancillary narration 
commenting on the dramatic action from yet another perspective. The narrative voice mostly 
stays in proximity to the main characters, but it may capriciously assume the perspective of 
anyone connected to the story.  
As in The Storm, overlapping voices give Ulysses a palpable sense of immediacy but 
also, more important, make it abundantly clear that events are much more complicated than they 
appear from any single perspective. Bloom’s relationship with his wife is an obvious example. In 
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“‘Marion of the Bountiful Bosoms,’” Heather Cook Callow points out that “Joyce has structured 
the narrative in such a way that the voices of male Dublin (including Bloom's) weigh heavily in 
our initial assessment of Molly, and their testimony comes down forcefully, in the first seven 
eighths of the novel, in favor of her beauty, sensuality, and immorality" (465). The most 
pronounced voice in this chorus is, of course, Bloom’s. From his perspective, Molly is the 
embodiment of insatiable female desire. By contrast, he presents himself as the tragically 
forsaken husband. As the reader begins to hear from other characters, however, especially Molly 
in the final episode, it becomes apparent that, while Molly is adulterous, Bloom’s perception of 
her is clouded by his own fantasies, fantasies which stem from his own lascivious nature. 
Molly’s meeting with Boylan, the reader discovers, was to a great extent orchestrated by Bloom, 
who, in addition to multiple sexual fetishes, has been involved in extramarital romances. Molly’s 
tryst is, by contrast, her first. Her thoughts further reveal that “she has been lonely most of her 
life,” and, following the death of her son, Rudy, she has remained chaste at her husband’s 
insistence (471, 473). A lack of affection thus moves Molly to adultery, and yet, despite the 
success of her meeting with Boylan, Molly’s thoughts repeatedly return to her husband. In the 
final episode, Molly is revealed as “a person whose loneliness, loss, and wistful optimism is 
every bit as moving as that of her generally sympathetically received husband” (466).  Is Molly 
an adulteress or a long-suffering wife? Is Bloom a henpecked husband or a lecher? The complex 
portrait developed in the novel affirms all these interpretations while revealing their clear limits. 
As more and more voices are sounded, the Blooms’ complex marriage, like Defoe’s storm, 
comes to be seen as rife with paradoxical intricacies that defy conventional stereotypes. Would it 
be possible to fully capture the Blooms’ marriage in an objective description? Such a treatment 
would have to include a description of the marriage from the perspective of each spouse as well 
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as of outsiders. Furthermore, such a description would have to incorporate the particular 
language of each individual to accurately capture the exact nuances of their individual 
interpretation. In short, a balanced account would look very much like the perspectival 
description Joyce offers. 
Defoe’s Argument for the Peculiarity of Style 
While the parallels between The Storm and Ulysses may be largely accidental, there is 
reason to suspect that they result from a similar recognition that traditional narrative is 
inescapably manipulative and fraught with danger. Both authors forge a new narrative style, one 
that avoids the exploitive potential inherent in traditional storytelling. Prior to The Storm, Defoe 
was known almost exclusively for his polemical pamphlets, which made effective use of 
rhetorical techniques such as satire. The Storm, however, is altogether unlike Defoe’s political 
writing. The persuasive strategies Defoe had used so successfully in the past are absent, replaced 
by detailed charts, inventories, and, most peculiarly for the time, eyewitness testimony. This 
stylistic shift suggests a shift in intention. No longer was Defoe interested in swaying his 
audience. In The Storm, his principal intention seems to be accurately chronicling the Great 
Storm, and, to achieve this aim, he conspicuously abandons the stylistic devices that made him 
famous. In the preface, he indicates that his duty to get at the truth has led him to abandon his 
exclusive hold on the narration of events.  
Because of the work’s novelty, Defoe takes great pains in the lengthy preface to explain 
his reasons for writing about The Great Storm and including multiple eyewitness accounts. Both 
the book’s subject matter and its style derive from what Defoe considers an important religious 
duty: telling the truth. Defoe, like many at the time, saw the storm as an act of “divine 
vengeance,” so every Christian witness should relay “God’s judgment” without error (64). Given 
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Defoe’s background as a shady businessman who was known to deceive not only his friends and 
relations but also his own mother-in-law, it is at first difficult to accept Defoe’s emphasis on the 
importance of truth-telling at face value (Backscheider 56-57). It is, however, reasonable to 
suppose that Defoe made a distinction between stretching the truth in his business dealings and 
outright lying in published writing. His having been imprisoned and indirectly bankrupted for 
libelous assertions might have helped to highlight this important distinction in his mind. 
Defoe begins with a comparison that illustrates the responsibility of authorship. A 
preacher, Defoe writes, has a great responsibility to speak the truth, for if he fails to do so he 
misleads not a single person but an entire congregation. The author of a published work, by 
comparison, speaks not merely to an initial group of readers but, because a published text may 
last into the distant future, to an almost infinite number of potential readers. An author who fails 
to speak the truth misleads an unfathomable multitude, committing an incalculable sin (3). The 
moral weight of deception is multiplied by the number of persons deceived, so the greater the 
number of persons misled, the greater the sin. This suggestion may explain Defoe’s apparently 
inconsistent stance on the value of truth-telling. The harm that results from lying is not limited 
merely to those who are addressed by the speaker, Defoe writes, but extends to everyone they 
unintentionally deceive as a consequence of the initial falsehood. An author’s lies are repeated 
by his readers, thus “our children tell lies after us, and their children after them,” and so on, “to 
the end of the world” (3). A writer may “impose” a deception “upon the world” and thus “abuse 
mankind” in its entirety (64). As if that were not enough to convince the reader that Defoe has 
given “serious consideration” to what an author “owes to truth,” he notes that writers such as 
himself who attempt to go beyond merely describing what happened to recommend some course 
of action run the risk of further compounding their sin (5). They may be guilty of lying and then 
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using this falsehood as the basis for moral condemnation, thus incurring the added sin of 
hypocrisy. 
Defoe adds that, though writers are typically guilty of no more than stretching the truth to 
make a story more engaging, such seemingly insignificant “white” lies can do great harm. 
“Impudence,” “ribaldry,” “fondness of telling a strange story,” and “empty flourishes” led 
“historians of remoter ages” to embellish and overemphasize accounts of actual events (5-6). 
Fact has been confounded with fantasy to such an extent that ancient history has become mere 
“romance.” So much uncertainty surrounds ancient history that it is impossible to know for 
certain anything about “the things and actions of remoter ages of the world” (5). In Defoe’s view, 
seemingly inconsequential white lies have unintentionally thrown an opaque veil over human 
history. In true Enlightenment spirit, Defoe, by contrast, pledges to reestablish history on a firm 
factual basis. Instead of describing the tempest entirely in his words he has chosen the “unusual 
method” of supplementing his account with “letters from the country in their own stile” despite 
the literary “meanness” of certain letters. Given an author’s responsibility to avoid deception, 
Defoe explains that his method springs from a desire “to keep close to the truth.” To stay close to 
the facts, Defoe discloses his “relation” to the “authorities” cited and reprints their accounts 
without substantial alteration (8). By allowing his correspondents to speak for themselves, 
Defoe, in effect, minimizes his responsibility for the veracity of their claims. In short, if his 
witnesses tell lies, he can exonerate himself legally and morally on the grounds that they are the 
deceivers, not him. Defoe merely recounts without alteration what has been reported by others.  
At first glance, Defoe’s moralistic “apology” for the unusual structure of The Storm may 
seem worlds apart from Joyce’s concerns in Ulysses, but it is an appreciation of the moral risks 
associated with authorship that unites Defoe and Joyce and explains the unusual narrative 
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structure of their works. Despite their own great literary abilities, both authors fear that speaking 
for others would almost certainly distort the truth. Given that both men were such capable 
stylists, the danger of twisting the truth was even more pressing. Defoe and Joyce would be 
especially tempted to use their talent to tell a more appealing story. Even an earnest commitment 
to the truth could not ensure against some unconscious alteration of detail that might ultimately 
prove to be momentous. The temptations before an author, especially a very gifted author, are 
considerable, and, for this reason, alternative voices are brought forward to deliberately eclipse 
that of the author. In The Storm, Defoe ultimately feels the need to retain some control over the 
narrative by playing the role of the collector. Joyce, by contrast, seems to feel that even this 
minimal role is too great a risky and he appears to relinquish control of the narrative altogether. 
Both authors remain at work in the background managing the voices at the fore, and this role too 
entails risk, but these risks are necessary to achieve some narrative coherence. In this respect, 




In his lecture on realism delivered just a few years before beginning Ulysses, Joyce 
focuses almost entirely on Daniel Defoe. The “star of poetry,” he writes, is conspicuously absent 
from Defoe’s writing, but, because of this absence, Defoe achieves “an admirably lucid, wholly 
unaffected style” (18). The lack of a musical element, he adds, is what distinguishes Defoe’s 
realism from that of naturalists such as Leo Tolstoy and Gerhart Hauptmann, which is animated 
by “the emotional revolt of modern man against human or superhuman iniquity” (17). In the 
works of these authors, there is a “studied ardor of indignation and protest” that is not found in 
Defoe, a writer who “defies and transcends the magical beguilement of music” (23, 22).  In this 
respect, Joyce suggests, it is possible to glimpse in Defoe’s work “the soul of the modern realist 
novel” (15). 
The unaffected style so much admired by Joyce is the result of Defoe’s early journalistic 
aspirations. In his extended nonfiction works, Defoe considered himself a chronicler rather than 
a poet and was more concerned with truth than beauty. He took pains to record current events 
with exactitude and developed a number of recognizable techniques that eventually found their 
way into his fiction, such as his unadorned style, use of colloquial phrases, and notoriously 
exhaustive inventories. Defoe’s famous characters, such as Moll Flanders and Roxana, have an 
unmistakable tabloid quality. Their vices as well as their virtues are unflinchingly paraded before 
the reader without recourse to censorship or romanticism. 
The techniques associated with Defoe’s nonfiction, which reappear in his fiction, seem to 
have influenced Joyce, especially his Ulysses. We see the same use of colloquial language, 
factual detail, and thorough catalogues, and persons and places are described without censorship 
or sentimentality. Moreover, in Ulysses, as in The Storm, the events of a relatively short period, 
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less than twenty-four hours, are recounted in exhaustive detail from alternative perspectives, and 
there is great effort to insure that the style and precise wording of individual accounts are 
faithfully preserved despite failings. Going further than Defoe, Joyce permits not only those 
directly involved in the story to speak but even persons at some distance from the action. Unlike 
in The Storm, no authoritative voice appears to contextualize and evaluate competing accounts. 
For both writers, this “matter-of-fact” realism appears motivated by a concern to prevent 
misunderstanding (“Defoe” 12). The fear is that, by singling out certain facts or prioritizing 
particular voices, something vital may be irretrievably lost and readers led astray. For this 
reason, narrative constraints are relaxed, and every fact and viewpoint, no matter how seemingly 
insignificant, may be faithfully chronicled for posterity, leaving the reader to judge this motley 
jumble for him or herself. Working through this rich tangle of details and reports places great 
strain on the reader, but only by carefully sifting through the assemblage can the reader ascertain 
the truth. Joyce’s metaphor for this careful weighing of evidence is an astronomer carefully 
establishing the distance of celestial objects by comparing distortions of parallax. 
Despite formal similarities, however, there appears an important difference between The 
Storm and Ulysses. Both works aspire to capture their subject as accurately as possible through a 
surplus of information, but, in The Storm, Defoe delivers a clear message to his readers and a call 
to action. Everyone who witnessed The Great Storm of 1703, he suggests, saw it as divine 
punishment and a call to Britain for spiritual repentance. Ulysses, by contrast, reveals a multi-
perspectival account of Dublin, which seems to preclude conviction and action, especially some 
larger agenda for Ireland. Viewed in this light, the novel appears to serve only a negative role, 
disrupting the seductive narratives offered by those with their own agenda for Ireland, such as 
the British government, the Catholic Church, and Irish nationalists. 
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Though it is easy to see Ulysses as merely disruptive, such readings overlook the 
relevance of the novel’s narrative structure to its story and, as a consequence, miss the work’s 
larger significance and appeal. In this thesis, I have argued that Joyce abandoned the notion of a 
single representative language in Ulysses but maintained the mimetic conception of art outlined 
in his early writing. Instead of crafting a single narrative, however, he chose instead to juxtapose 
supplemental viewpoints, genres, and styles, much in the manner of Defoe’s The Storm. This 
approach to the novel highlights the consistency between Joyce’s critical writing and his fiction. 
More important, it ties together Ulysses’s unusual narrative structure and its story insofar as the 
novel’s perspectivism closely parallels Leopold Bloom’s empathy.  
Opening with Stephen Dedalus, Ulysses appears initially as the continuation of A Portrait 
of the Artist, and the similarity of narrative style suggests that there has been little development 
in the interim between novels. Stephen continues to struggle to free himself from forces of 
stagnation and discover his own voice as an artist. The narrative, approximating free indirect 
discourse, echoes Stephen’s thoughts as well as those who press him with their own agenda for 
his future. A profound change, nevertheless, occurs once Stephen and Bloom cross paths for the 
first time in “Aeolus.” Here alternative perspectives, voices, and styles become increasingly 
pronounced in the narrative, closely mirroring Bloom’s empathetic embrace of multiple 
viewpoints. The transition of protagonists is matched here by a change of style and mindset. 
Noting Bloom’s unusually sympathetic disposition, critics suggest that he serves as a 
contrast to the myopic perspective of other characters. Whenever possible, Bloom attempts to 
imaginatively see the word as others see it. Bloom endeavors to understand what it would be like 
to be blind as he helps a sightless boy cross the street (148-49). He attempts to interpret his cat’s 
meows in “Calypso” and speculates that, to his cat, he must appear to be the “Height of a tower” 
63 
 
(45). He sympathizes with Mina Purefoy’s labor and delivery pains in “Lestrygonians” and 
gelded workhorses in “The Lotus-Eaters” (134, 63).  He commiserates with fish, which must, it 
seems to him, suffer seasickness, and imagines the thrill pigeons experience as they soar high 
above the Irish house of parliament and drop their load (310, 133).24 
Bloom’s broad-mindedness makes him a very likeable protagonist, and, as Timothy 
Brennan points out, this sympathy is exactly what Stephen, the artist, needs despite all his talent 
and promise. “Compassion,” Brennan writes, “is just what the over-literary Stephen lacks and 
perhaps this is why his eloquence has been pissed away in oratory … and his writing replaced by 
occasional scribbling” (148). Though Stephen may represent the young Joyce, Brennan proposes 
that “Bloom, not Stephen, is Joyce’s aesthetic spokesman in Ulysses” (147). If Stephen is in need 
of Bloom’s empathetic vision to create a work that captures the world around him, then the 
transition from Stephen to Bloom illustrates the artist’s journey to inspiration and greater 
maturity. 
On this view, Bloom embodies the ideal of sympathetic understanding toward which the 
artist aspires in representation. Bloom recognizes that his own standpoint is limited and thus 
attempts to see the world compassionately from the vantage points of those he encounters. Even 
when his attempts at understanding overreach, as with his cat, he remains aware that every living 
being has a perspective, often very different from his own. By imaginatively embodying these 
diverse standpoints, he comes to see his surroundings and himself much more clearly than other 
                                                 
24 There are, of course, many other instances of Bloom’s sympathy but these six examples have been discussed in 
criticism. White considers the blind stripling, Rando examines Bloom’s cat, and Brennan notes Bloom’s sympathy 
for Mina Purefoy and the gelded workhorses. Finally, Weinstein mentions Bloom’s speculations about fish and 
pigeons in his chapter on Ulysses.   
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characters do. Unfortunately, he lacks the technical skills required to express this understanding 
in an artistic medium. In this sense, Bloom illustrates artistic inspiration rather than technique. 
Though Bloom’s creative insights appear wasted due to his lack of technical ability, the 
novel suggests that he may ultimately serve to inspire the struggling writer, Stephen, who 
conversely wields great technical skill but lacks empathetic understanding. If Stephen could 
adopt Bloom’s perspectival polyglotism, he, unlike Bloom, would have the technical skills 
needed to render a realistic portrait of his Dublin surroundings. Moreover, he might be able to 
portray himself as a protagonist in such a way that his own struggle to find his literary voice is 
clearly revealed. Bloom and Stephen, therefore, represent different sides of the creative process, 
inspiration and execution, which must be unified to create a fully realized and successful work of 
art. 
Viewed in this light, Ulysses, like the novel that precedes it, is in large part about the 
development of the artist. To represent the world around him truthfully, Stephen must acquire 
Bloom’s sympathetic disposition. In other words, his technical ability must be matched with 
equally sharp insight. By directly incorporating a diversity of representative Dublin voices, the 
latter sections of the novel demonstrate what such a perspectival representation looks like. 
Instead of combining distinct voices in a single narrative, each voice individually contributes to 
the representation. The aim is not to demonstrate the relativity of language but to render the 
novel’s subject or, better, overlapping subjects with unprecedented and uncompromising 
verisimilitude.  
Not only does the narrative diversity in the latter portions of the novel illustrate the 
perspectivism required to faithfully represent the artist and the artist’s surroundings, but the 
novel’s shifting voices mirror the growth of the artist from the narrow perspective of the initial 
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episodes to the richer, more complex composites of the later episodes. The transition from single 
to multiple perspectives occurs in “Aeolus,” the point in the novel where the central protagonists, 
Stephen and Bloom, accidentally cross paths at the Freeman offices and, by implication, where 
artistic technique comes to be paired with commensurate inspiration. This crossing represents the 
transition from youth to maturity, dependence to independence, and stagnation to liberation.  
What is the relevance of Joyce’s binocular vision to the average reader who, like Bloom, 
lacks the technical skill to create art? There seems good reason to view Bloom as Joyce’s literary 
representative, but he is more than a symbol of mature artistic understanding. The binocular 
perspective that endows Bloom with aesthetic insight differentiates him from other Dubliners 
who seem to be hopelessly mired in their own, or others’, monopolizing narratives. Unlike those 
he encounters during his day’s sojourn, Bloom readily tries out different points of view, and thus 
he never appears in danger of being imprisoned within his own narrow imagination or anyone 
else’s. In this respect, whether or not we aspire to artistry on a grand scale, we should aspire to 
navigate the world as artfully as the nimble Bloom. 
Dublin as portrayed in Ulysses, as well as in Joyce’s earlier works, is characterized by 
patterns of stagnation, backwardness, and corruption. Even Stephen, at the outset of Ulysses, 
appears to be in a rut and in danger of squandering his talents. Joyce’s characters are trapped in 
this cycle because they are unable to throw off narratives of themselves and their surroundings 
that have been thrust upon them, often by the people and institutions that they most trust. In this 
sense, they dwell within prisons of their own imagination, unable even to conceive how their 
world might look differently. It is the ability to make an empathetic leap of the imagination that 
sets Bloom apart from everyone else. Even when his empathetic efforts fall far short, Bloom 
remains cognizant that he and his surroundings can be seen differently. 
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All this is not to say that Bloom’s binocular vision is relativistic or, much less, nihilistic. 
Far from seeing every perspective as equal, Bloom tries out different points of view in order to 
ascertain the truth, and, in this sense, he operates, though he does not fully realize it, by 
something like astronomical parallax. That is, just as we gain a sense of distance through 
comparison of alternate perspectives, Bloom gets a sense of truth by evaluating different points 
of view. This parallactic vision offers Bloom a more accurate sense of himself and his 
surrounding than those around him, and it enables him to live in Dublin while avoiding the 
powerfully seductive tropes that engender the pervasive cycle of pessimism, indolence, and 
decay. For all his obvious foolishness, Bloom, in many respects, appears much wiser than his 
Dublin counterparts.  
Those who ascribe to Ulysses an overall mood of lighthearted playfulness are of course 
thinking primarily of those episodes that involve Bloom, but this distinct mood captures not 
cynicism about the possibilities of language, but Bloom’s attitude toward life, which is strikingly 
at odds with the prevailing mindset. Unlike other Dubliners, Bloom feels free to playfully try on 
different perspectives until he finds one that allows him to see the world aright. For this reason, 
Bloom sees opportunities where others see only misfortune and, consequently, he remains 
optimistic while those around him sink deeper into hopelessness. The contrast is most 
pronounced in “Cyclops,” when Bloom directly confronts the narrow-minded and violent 
“citizen.”  
Is Bloom’s compassion, we might ask, a trait that can be recommended? Aren’t people 
like Bloom simply born with empathy? Bloom’s compassion, Ulysses suggests, is not as natural 
as it first appears. Repeatedly, we see Bloom working hard to see the world from an alternate 
point of view, and his musings show those who wish to imitate him how they too can share his 
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binocular vision. Bloom begins by recognizing that others have a different perspective, and then 
he proceeds to imagine, largely through analogy, what it must be like to see the world 
differently. To an extent, this imaginative exercise is purely cognitive, but seeing the world from 
a different perspective often gives rise to associated emotions. Far from being natural, Bloom’s 
empathy appears as a cultivated trait that can be imitated. 
Why should we aspire to Bloom’s empathy? When we consider alternative ways of 
understanding the world, we begin to appreciate that our purview is limited and that we have 
blindnesses we fail to recognize. This realization loosens the grip of our own particular 
perspective and, at the same time, drives us to search out additional perspectives to supplement 
our own. In this respect, Ulysses, like The Storm, is more than a chronicle of events. It is an 
exhortation to the reader to embrace a different, and saving, way of seeing. The restless and 
cacophonous voices of Ulysses lift the reader out of stagnation like a rising tide and introduce a 
chorus of new possibilities. Though it is tempting to cling to one voice, the novel suggests that, 
like Bloom, we should allow ourselves to be carried by the chorus. Far from being relativistic, 
even nihilistic, the novel is just the opposite. The voices of Ulysses urge us to exceed our 
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